

Between Patriarchs and Politicians

A Comparative Study of the Effects of Separatism on Religious Minority Rebellion Onset

Markus Keller



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Markus Keller

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Abstract

Prior studies have shown that *separatism* within a repressed minority is one of the strongest indicators of rebellion. Further, ethnic minorities that are repressed based on their ethnicity develop grievances and rebellion on the basis of this. Religion, as a sub category however follows different patterns. Religion does not in itself increase the risk of rebellion, but in cases where the religious minority has an *active separatism*, probability of rebellion, as well as the conflict intensity, increases dramatically—even more so than separatism in itself.

This pattern has been used as a measurement of *religious nationalism*. This is probable, but not proven. Further, the mechanism in which *religion* and *separatism* interacts to produce this volatile conflicts is not described systematically.

Through a comparative study of three cases selected on the basis of prior statistical studies, this thesis looks at what *separatism* is an indicator of, how *separatism* and *religion* interacts, and through what mechanisms they seem to affect each other.

What I find is, amongst other, that the religion separatism-nexus is not a measurement of religious nationalism; rather that *separatism* indicates a property of the religious identity-narrative. If the identity suggests a bond to the majority, the probability of development of motive for rebellion is less. If the identity informs a bond to, in these cases, the West, the probability of development of motive for rebellion increases. Finally, if repression is so grave that motive for rebellion is inevitable, the identity will change. Identity and motive thus communicates, and both will change to align itself with the other.

Preface – Piercing the Texture of Numbers

I always find prefaces and forewords rather meaningless to read. If you have an entire text to express yourself, what is the meaning of *one* page? Often these become meaningless pieces that just as well could be left out. This was my plan.

Still, after having written an entire text myself, there is one experience I truly feel the need to express. In the beginning, when I was working with the statistical data. I *saw* the words and numbers, and read the reports and summaries. I knew what they meant, but not the gravity of it. Going into the case studies, what baffled me the most was the *reality* behind the data. Each little number and correlation in the data suddenly equaled hundreds of brutal murders, rape and torture on actual humans and families having to cope. Children traumatized for life, contrasted by the greed and self-righteousness of the perpetrators. The distance immanent in the numbers of the datasets seems *intriguing*, and the hunt for patterns a game. The reality that pierced through the numbers as I began looking closer at the cases was nauseating, and spoke to my sense of right and wrong. Still, at the same time as the cases made me realize the shallowness of the numbers, I equally understood that this did not give justice to the individual experiences behind the cases. When “Sudanese villages was systematically attacked by militiamen in the early 1980s”, this implied an individual crisis and a life changing trauma to each and every one of the survivors. Closing in on these destinies religion becomes logic as a way of coping with life.

The paradox of the numbers is the way one *destiny* can make you weep, one *case* can make you think, whereas a *dataset* invites you to play.

Statisticians studying conflict should never forget this; that each little number is written with blood; and each curve is an ocean of human lives rendered worthless and crushed by the greed and ideology of leaders.

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Secondly I wish to thank Prof. Dr. Andreas Feldtkeller (HU, Berlin), for kindly offering to supervise me, give me guidance, calming me down, and most importantly introducing me to framework which has allowed me to analyze religion in the way this thesis needed. I also wish to thank Dr. Alexander De Juan (GIGA, Hamburg) whom, with his experience with qualitative analysis based on the MAR-dataset, offered me response to the overall design of the thesis. Last but not least of the academic responses I have to thank Dr. Jonathan Fox for taking the time to responding to the confused e-mail from a Norwegian master's student one year ago – as well as letting go of this piece of research.

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Beyond this, all errors and misunderstandings are my own, and I take the full responsibility for the final text.

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1 Introduction

1.1 Background and knowledge gap

After being neglected for decades, studies of religion and conflict-nexus became a central aspect within political science during the second half of the 1990s. Especially in the aftermath of Huntington's *Clash of Civilizations* (1993,1996) the question of religion's importance was debated and studied to a growing extent (Philpott 2009).

One important segment of these studies focused on statistically testing Huntington's claims, e.g. by Jonathan Fox. Through studies on the Minority at Risk dataset (MAR) he also produced a range of studies that set out to test "the religious factor" on minority rebellion¹. Basing his work on mobilization theory and prior studies by Ted Gurr (1970, 1993, 1997), he found that religious minorities did not seem to react to repression in a way that comparable categories, such as ethnicity, did. However, close to all religious minorities that engaged in rebellion had a third factor present, namely *separatism*. Finding the same patterns in following studies, he operationalized this as *religious nationalism*. Still, one does not know what *separatism* indicates in this setting, and it is not given that the phenomenon *is* religious nationalism. Further, there exists no real explanation of which mechanisms this religion separatism-nexus follows. The knowledge gap I wish to fill is thus what *separatism* is, and through what mechanisms the religion separatism-nexus produces more incidents of rebellion.

1.2 Research Objectives and Methodological approach

To be able to fill this knowledge gap this study examines how religion and separatism affects minority rebellion through comparison of three cases. By replicating statistical studies, three representative and comparable cases—the Southerners in Sudan, the Copts in Egypt, and the Maronites in Lebanon—are selected to inform the analysis of the phenomenon. Through a mixture of historical comparison, process-tracing and congruence method the cases are analyzed to shed light over the religion separatism-nexus.

¹ Rebellion in this context is to be understood as the violent resistance of a minority towards state repression. It thus offers a dyadic perspective to intra-state conflict or civil war.

Based on prior studies and reasonable assumptions I hypothesize that the religion separatism-nexus *is* a measurement of religious nationalism. Based on the notion that religion need not be political I further hypothesize that separatism might be a factor that *politicizes* religion, and that from this point on the mechanisms explained by Juergensmeyer (1993, 2003), intensifies conflicts.

What I find is that the religion separatism-nexus is *not* a measurement of religious nationalism, but that the identity-narrative of the minority, if informs a bond to the West, increases the likelihood of relative deprivation. If the identity-narrative informs a local connection and cross-communal bond, it is likely that a certain amount of repression will be tolerated, and that grievances will not develop.

As such it contradicts prior theories emphasizing primordial notions of religious identity, as the reason for religious minority rebellion, because religious identities are seen to change over time. It also corrects studies emphasizing the importance of grievances and motive, by underlining these as most often identity-driven.

At a meta-level this thesis, through a critical evaluation of the study of the religion and conflict-nexus attempts to bridge two different approaches to the study of religion and conflict—one that tends to apply statistical approaches and measure religion as a first order phenomenon, and one that tends to favor small-N studies and conceptualizations of religion as a second order phenomenon. In line with mixed methods approaches I hold that for the study of religion and conflict to be able to yield its full potential, the two methodologies must communicate. To make this possible one first needs to agree on the phenomenon one is studying. To do this I apply an analytical framework that allows for analysis and comparison of religion in both methodologies without losing the rigidity required for such analyses.

1.3 Outline of thesis

Developed between three different academic discourses this thesis begins by outlining previous studies and the theoretical background. Looking back, this chapter attempts to give the underpinning of the argument for why and how this study should be done.

The following chapter focuses on methodology and the design of the thesis. The theoretical framework is operationalized, the methodology is evaluated, and the selection of the cases is discussed and concluded.

Each of the analyses of the three cases begins by outlining the issues and actors of the conflict, the period of analysis, and an intra-case comparative perspective is chosen. After introducing the background of the conflict, I give a historical overview of the period of analysis. The next sub-chapter deals with how religion can be seen to act, change and affect the conflict. In the subsequent three sub-chapters, and based on the prior texts, the analytical framework is applied and the identity, opportunity and motive of the minority is discussed. Summarizing each case I develop the conclusion that is summarized in the final chapter.

2 Previous Research and Theoretical Framework

This thesis draws on several different academic discourses. As a consequence the theoretical outline gets a different purpose and content. Due to the limits of this chapter I have had to prioritize what aspects to include. This is a potential weakness of the thesis, but a necessity. As this thesis is based on replicated statistical analyses, the theoretical framework has much of its basis in these, and has to echo their evaluations. I use the first part of this chapter to outline their discussions, evaluations and findings, and forming the basis of the following discussions. To investigate the mechanisms behind their findings I apply a closer focus. This, along with weakness in Fox and Nordås' operationalization of religion, requires a different approach. The second part of this chapter will therefore focus on their operationalization of religion, how it can be understood among other academic studies of the religion and conflict-nexus, and weaknesses within these approaches. As the enhancement has to do with conceptualization of religion I will, in the third part of this chapter, give a short introduction to such conceptualizations as an introduction to Feldtkeller's framework.

2.1 Nordås, Fox and Statistical Studies on Religious Minority Rebellion

Group mobilization theory has identified three necessary preconditions for rebellion to develop – of which none is sufficient in itself.² The group needs to have a common *identity*, an *opportunity* to challenge the authorities, and a *motive* to do so (Nordås 2010:121; Gurr 2000:5,94; Deutsch 2000:851). Both Nordås and Fox apply these three factors to analyze how religion affects the development of rebellion (Nordås 2010:121; Fox 2000a).

The concept *identity* offers two elements. First of all it gives the group a common bond and a felt common destiny. What is done to some concerns everyone. Secondly it informs the group of an essential difference between them and other groups (Gurr 2000:4-5).

Opportunity reflects both group capacity and external structures allowing rebellion. Internally it has to do with the relative size of the minority, its organization, resources and alliances

² Whereas some emphasize the competitive relation between the three, Nordås and Fox both analyze the three as equal necessities in their respective studies.

(Nordås 2010:122-3). Externally it can be affected by the politics of the governing regime, or a result of a transient situation whereby the opportunity opens (Gurr 2000:80ff). The MAR-dataset can be understood to have part of this criterion incorporated in its selection of units, as a criterion for being a minority in the MAR-dataset is that you are politically active and of relevant size (Minorities at Risk 2009).

In 1970 Gurr published the classic *Why Men Rebel* wherein he explores why people engage in political violence and rebellion in general (Gurr 1970). He identifies as one of the central factors for predicting rebellion is what he calls relative deprivation, or the “perceived discrepancy between value expectations and value capabilities” – in other words the state you are in versus the state you feel you should be in – as a central factor for predicting rebellion (Gurr 1970:37). A group feeling that it does not get what it deserves is more likely to develop rebellion. Relative deprivation, through the development of *grievances* over the issues of deprivation, is related to *motive* to rebel. One of the strongest indicators of relative deprivation is *repression* (Fox2004:721; Nordås 2010:129). When Fox (2000a) analyses motive, repression is the central indicator used.

The MAR-dataset aims at monitoring, creating data for analysis, and providing a risk evaluation of politically active communal groups throughout the world (Davenport 2003:5). Minorities are categorized in dyadic relations to the states in which they exist. Based on his work from 1970 Gurr did an analysis of the MAR-data investigating what factors were relevant when trying to understand why *minorities* rebel (Gurr 1993). In this study there were three categories of grievances – *cultural and social*, *economical*, and *political*. In this framework *religion* is considered a salient part of ethnicity and is not analyzed separately (Gurr 1993:173; Fox 1999:294). Fox’s (2000a) analysis of the MAR-dataset was initially a further development of Gurr’s analyses (1993,1997) regarding what role religion plays in the development of rebellion among religious minorities. The justification of this perspective was the growing literature and academic focus on religion as a reemerging factor in international conflicts after the Cold War. By reproducing a design close to Gurr’s and applying a mix of Gurr’s framework and group mobilization theory to the same dataset, Fox expected to find a relatively similar pattern. However, in this analysis for the years 1990-1994 he finds that religion does *not* seem to play a critical role, even though the usual criteria for rebellion is in place. Instead he finds that all religious minorities engaging in high levels of rebellion were characterized by a third factor, which seemed to be identified with nearly all intrastate

religious conflicts – *separatism*. However he does not conclude on this being the definitive factor. More specifically, whereas religious grievances seem to have less influence on conflict intensity than Gurr found for other cultural grievances, *all* religious minorities that had a factor of rebellion from 5-7 (Intermediate guerilla activity – protracted civil war) (appendix II) were registered with autonomy grievances (Fox 2000a).

Briefly discussing this pattern he concludes that the two main obstacles for understanding it is the fact that the study did not systematically investigate the phenomenon, resulting in an inability to decisively conclude, what the variable *separatism* measured.

In light of Gurr's identification of separatism as one of the strongest predicaments for minority-rebellion, Fox (2004) elaborated on this finding, stating that religion merged with separatism seems to be an extra volatile combination. He also further suggests that it might be a product of the phenomenon *religious nationalism* as identified by among others Juergensmeyer (Fox 2004:728). He operationalizes religious nationalism as *(belief +1)*separatism* based on previous findings (Fox 2004:721). He finds religion and *separatism* behaving in the same pattern between 1996-2000 regarding onset. He also finds that this nexus increases the *intensity* of rebellion far more than what can be expected from conflicts where rebels are separatists but not religiously distinct (Fox 2004:728). This conclusion is further echoed by Nordås (2010:173) finding her analysis of intrastate religious conflict-severity in need of another dimension to explain an incident of increased conflict severity. Her PhD-thesis is based on a mixed methods approach. Findings from qualitative research on the religion conflict-nexus forms the criteria for how religion is measured in following quantitative studies on an augmented version of the UCSP/PRIO Armed Conflict Database (Nordås 2010:31). Applying the group mobilization theory as summarized in Gurr (2000), the dissertation amongst others tests the relevance of religion in minority rebellion from 1990-2004. Summarizing previous research she concludes that there are three general trends within studies explaining religious minority rebellion: One emphasizes motive (constructivism); another emphasizes identity (primordialism); and yet another emphasizes opportunity (economical/size) (Nordås 2010:126-9). She finds in here study an argument supporting the emphasis of motive and repression-rebellion dynamics relative to size (Nordås 2010:148-50). She does not look for the pattern Fox identifies, but evaluating her data suggests that the pattern that is probable even from the UCSP/PRIO-dataset. (Appendix III)

The nexus Fox emphasizes is also supported by the concept of *religious nationalism*, and this formed the basis for his analysis from 2004. Still I argue that the conclusion, that *separatism* measures *nationalism*, is a hasty one. To evaluate its correctness I will do an exploratory analysis of a selection of cases from the MAR-dataset. By doing this I will determine whether it is *nationalism* or some other factor. I can also begin to answer the question of what seems to happen as the two merge.

This approach to religion also has a central strength contrasting Huntington's Clash of Civilizations theory. In not identify religion as one first order phenomenon it produces a pattern which is comparable across all manifestations and contexts, it is thus far more compatible to theories of religion more commonly applied outside statistical analyses. In addition, based on its quantitative nature, it tells more about a phenomena like this in terms of general tendencies, than regular case-studies, where constructivist theories is more broadly in use. Together such approaches will add to a better understanding of the religion and conflict-nexus.

As the starting-point of this thesis it becomes natural to ask, what this nexus is. Is it, as Fox suggests, an indicator of religious nationalism, or is it something else? Is this a mechanism within religion that gets triggered by separatism, or vice versa, which allows for more volatile conflict behavior? Answering this calls for a controlled closer look at the phenomenon. This becomes possible through a comparative investigation based on cases selected through a statistical reproduction of the pattern. However, comparing religion across cases is in itself not straight forward. One of the problems related to studying religion is a lack of consensus of what religion *is*, even less how it can be measured. As religion in its nature can be conceived as a second order phenomenon, it naturally changes radically from context to context (Beckford 2003:2 in Krogseth 2007:65). Likewise, studies on the religion and conflict-nexus have had issues pinpointing the religious factor, and while one side has held religion to be difficult to compare across large-N studies, others have attempted to frame religion as a first order-phenomenon without much results. Conceptualizations of the first kind are often so open-ended that it becomes close to impossible to maintain rigidity across cases. The latter yields results, but most probably does not measure what it sets out to do.

Attempting to bring something new into this picture requires a conceptualization of religion that can do several things: First of all, it needs to justify a cross-contextual comparative approach. In this study this is partially done through the fact that a statistical pattern is

identified, which seems to support a second order conceptualization, in that a third factor triggers conflict. Naturally it needs to operationalize religion as a second order social phenomenon. Finally, it has to incorporate a broadness of social religious structures, in a way that makes it usable in a comparative study. In the following I will discuss how religion has been conceptualized in conflict studies, with an emphasis on statistics, before I discuss and criticize Nordås and Fox' conceptualizations, and formulate what is necessary to perform the following study.

2.2 Studies on the Religion and Conflict-Nexus

Religion has undoubtedly played a central role in several conflicts throughout history. Yet there has never existed a theory that could really explain this relation. From the beginning of the 20th century and throughout the Cold War era, the predominant theories predicted religion would diminish as modernity and enlightenment progressed. Equally, within conflict studies the focus on religion was scarce. From the 1970s the interest started to grow as religion reentered the international political arena, and from the end of the Cold War the hunt for what was dubbed *The revenge of God* began (Fox 2002:1). While this was a general tendency, I will frame it through the works of two central researchers, Huntington and Juergensmeyer.

Both Juergensmeyer and Huntington published the relevant works in 1993, catapulting religion into the center stage of conflict studies, but represent different academic traditions and affected the academic world differently.

Juergensmeyer, not as radical as Huntington, published a book on religious nationalism where he investigated the different ways religion seemed to affect politics throughout the world. Through an approach based on case studies and field work he was able to provide an inside view of religions influence on communities and individual believers. This contrasts the approach of Huntington. Searching for factors that could affect the pattern of conflicts after the Cold War Huntington in 1993 published the theory known as *Clash of Civilizations*. This work was a hypothesis in the form of a grand theory stating that religion, in the form of civilizations, would be the new pattern underlying conflicts in the decades to come (Huntington 1993,1996; Juergensmeyer 1993). Even though both are referenced by social scientists of all methodologies, their differences can be seen as the beginning of a dichotomous tendency within the study of the religion and conflict-nexus in the decades that

followed. The reason for this is, as I see it, the way religion has been conceptualized. Whereas Juergensmeyer treated religion as a second order phenomenon, Huntington conceptualized it as a first order phenomenon. The latter invites to statistical large-N studies, as the measurement is rather straight forward, and if done right, gives the most predictability. In statistical studies religion is usually conceptualized as a social and psychological system, centered around a spiritual supreme being. Often the social impact of theological teachings is discussed, but the discussion is not followed up by nuanced data (Toft 2007; Reynal-Querol 2002; Philpott 2009; Nordås 2010; Fox 1999, 2000a, 2004). The reason for this is that data on religions are lacking (Nordås 2010:24-9). Only some of the above chose to collect their own data on religion and augment the conflict-datasets, but this is usually only a more elaborate variant of the original data. One can find data to some extent relating the number of adherents to different religions and denominations, but this is a coarse description and does not say much about level of devotion, form of belief, or importance of dogmatic teachings. More and more, the general conclusion emerging from statistical studies on religion and conflicts is that few patterns have been found which can be considered significant, and that statistical studies lack under weak datasets (Nordås 2010).

On the other hand case studies on religion and conflict have applied a conceptualization of religion that accommodates the differences. Seeing religion in different constellations suggests an application of conceptualizations of religion in a way that does not invite to comparisons across more than a few cases at most. And the search for generalizable patterns on the religion and conflict-nexus among statisticians is, among the quantitative studies I have read and the researchers I have spoken to, considered close to meaningless. Naturally, through experience with religion as a changing phenomenon from context to context, this claim should be respected—but not followed. Whereas the conceptualization of religion is weak and the data is poor, *methods* cannot be disclaimed in themselves. For the study of the religion and conflict-nexus to be able to move the next step, the two methodologies, largely rendered unable to communicate by the differences in conceptualizations, need to learn from each other's approaches. Statisticians need to question the existing data, and apply approaches of religion as a second order phenomenon. Likewise qualitative researchers should communicate to a greater extent with the statistical studies.

Nordås and Fox have both chosen to augment the conflict datasets with their own data on religion, but their conceptualizations of religion are weak in that they are too broad. While

this ensures religion is framed in all its manifestations, it lacks the systematical categorization they operate with regards to *rebellion*.

One aim of this study is to suggest a conceptualization of religion that communicates across both methodological disciplines, incorporating sensitivity towards the second-order nature of religion, while still being operational with regards to broader comparative studies. For this I suggest Feldtkeller's recently published theoretical framework on religion as social communication because it represents the broadness and rigidity necessary for cross-religious comparison, while simultaneously being founded around religion as a second-order phenomenon. In the following I will firstly present an overview of conceptualizations of religion within religious studies before introducing Feldtkeller's framework and its development.

2.3 Conceptualizing Religion

Defining religion has, as previously argued, not been a straight forward task within conflict studies. Then, neither is the case within religious studies. Outside of the primordialist-constructivist dichotomy within political science and conflict studies, one of the few things religious studies have largely agreed upon is that religion is a second-order phenomenon, shifting form, purpose, and importance from context to context, time to time (Krogseth 2007:65-7). Indeed, it is recognized that theological dogma and religious leaders can have an unprecedented influence over individual believers, but it is not necessarily always so. Religion, one or several, can equally be a marginal part of a complex identity. And even if religion is important, as Heelas and Woodhead (2000) writes, the way you practice it can make you have more in common with a segment of a different religion than elements of the one you follow.

Still there are a multitude of conceptualizations of religion out there. As these are witnesses of, it is difficult to define religion without either capturing other phenomena or missing things usually understood as religion (Krogseth 2007:72). If one defines religion as "belief in spiritual beings" one often excludes non-western religions. Widening the definition, it becomes difficult to ensure one measures what one intended. The definition must always capture what the researcher intends to capture, and she must be aware of weaknesses. It

therefore becomes central to begin by asking what aspects of religion are necessary to capture, and how close one can go before losing sight?

Measuring religion as a second order social phenomenon, it is relevant to find out how religion plays a part in the minority's response to repression. On the basis of this the definition needs to say something about what defines religion. Feldtkeller's framework allows me to do this.

Defining religion as one of several worldviews, Feldtkeller goes on to compare it with philosophical and scientific worldviews. These are all systems whereby reality is framed across the four realities of the body, the material, the mind, and the social world. He thus defines these as in essence having an equal claim in reality. (Feldtkeller forthcoming:85) What makes a worldview *religious* is the way the wholeness of real is ensured by an "instance beyond the possibilities of human effort". What man can do is to enter this "interpretation of reality considered not to be man-made". (Feldtkeller forthcoming:88) It can only do this by symbolizing reality, and to do this it needs to use one of the four realities. Moving on he develops a framework suggesting how religion applies social structures to communicate the wholeness of reality. Through a historical analysis he identifies six forms of sociomorph communication of the wholeness of reality that religions can take: communication of (1a) common descent, (1b) news, (2a) power, (2b) knowledge, (3a) humankind, and (3b) network communication. (Feldtkeller forthcoming:98) He finds these to have developed in pairs throughout history, during the (1) Paleolithic Age, (2) the Pharaonic Era, and (3) with the appearance of revelation-based religions like Buddhism, Christianity and Islam.

This is a development of Sundermeier's notion of primary and secondary religion, including additional aspects based on criticism from Jan Assmann (2005:65-7) regarding Sundermeier's concept not being able to capture Ancient Egyptian religion.

In Feldtkeller's theoretical framework, religion as communication of descent is one of the oldest and fundamental functions of religion, dating back to the dawn of civilization (Feldtkeller forthcoming:98). In many ways this echoes Sundermeier's concept of primary religion, which is meant to describe religion in small-scale societies (Sundermeier 1999:34f). Still this function of religion is not limited to what was earlier named primitive cultures, but continues to be an aspect of religious practice (Feldtkeller forthcoming:98; Sundermeier 1999:36).

The characteristics associated with religion as communication of descent, are related to the forms of religious practices one finds traces of from the Paleolithic Age. Central here is the development of ritual practices that define and structure group descent. In the archeological findings from this period one sees that religious practice was associated with burials. One also assumes there were rituals related to childbirth and the establishment of stable sexual relations (Feldtkeller forthcoming:93). In later times communication of descent is related to rituals, and perhaps most centrally myths communicating ideas relating to origins of the group.

Religion as communication of news is also related to the Paleolithic age, and functions as a parallel counter-movement. Where communication of descent is described as an in-group-communication, communication of news is the parallel out-group-communication. This is based on wide spread similar religious practices, which indicate some sort of interaction between communities of different descent. Such practices are distribution of burial practices, sacrifice of plants and animals, iconographic practices, and similar statues (Feldtkeller forthcoming:93). This interaction is possible to imagine as both violent and one non-violent. Groups fighting each other may have stolen artifacts, transmitting images and religious ideas. Also relatively small groups could not sustain a healthy reproduction without exchange of sexual partners. Lastly, ideas can be communicated through occasional contact (Feldtkeller forthcoming:94). This is a parallel to the modern religious syncretism seen for example in New Age-movements.

As the societal structure in which humans interacted changed from the establishments of imperial political structures in Egypt and Mesopotamia 4000 years BCE, so did religion. From a societal structure that emphasized an inherent bond between members, the new societal structure was based on stratification of individuals based on their function in society. With this structure society would grow to larger units than the tribes of the Paleolithic Age. A society of this size needs a glue to hold the individuals together in a structural order – which the narratives and form of religions secured. Through emotive dimensions of religion the ethics of each strata became internalized in each individual – both justifying the elevation of the ruler and the ethos of each citizen. This new function of religion did not only offer a common divine identity, but gave the ruler a special divine mandate to rule, ensuring the subjects knew what was expected (Feldtkeller forthcoming:94). *Communication of Power* has certain characteristics that distinguish it from the other. The ruler was given a divine mandate to rule. The rulers themselves secured the stability of societal structure. This justified

certain chains of command, which often had mythological parallels. The ruler's divine status was communicated through iconographical representations in the likenings of deities and symbols communicating power. Also rulers are often installed by divinities, or have divine ancestry. Religious communication of power is often linked to violence. In Egypt there are images indicating the Pharaohs' divine mandate for violence. Still this form of religious communication does not necessarily imply a higher level of violence. It can also be identified with the opposite, as monopolization of violence often reduces conflict (Feldtkeller forthcoming:95).

With the size and complexity of the new society came a need for accumulation and preservation of knowledge, and the establishment of structures that could encompass *communication of knowledge*. (Feldtkeller forthcoming:96) Within such religious institutions scripture was developed, enabling knowledge to be stored and handled outside the human brain. Different orders focusing on different knowledge were established, and schools or teacher/student relations were put into system to secure the communication of knowledge in society. Traits of this form of communication were the establishment of schools and orders (Feldtkeller forthcoming:96). In modern society most of the knowledge-structures are secularized, but in many states one finds educational systems supplied with religious educators by religious institutions, or parallel religious education.

With the emergence of religions like Buddhism, Christianity and Islam there is need for a new categorization of the forms religious communication can take. Parallel to Sundermeier's concept *secondary religion* (Sundermeier 1999:36), Feldtkeller defines this form of religion based on its universalism and individualism. The fundament of this form of religion is the universal and fundamental problem of existence, which *all humans* have an equal part in. The religion points to a revelation in which the solution to this problem is communicated. (Feldtkeller forthcoming:97) Buddhism has the eightfold path, Christianity applies an ethical or mystical transformation, and Islam prescribes an attitude and a way of life, ethically and socially. This solution is accessible to all humans, and is therefore closely related to mission (Feldtkeller forthcoming:97). Ethnical or cultural borders do not limit this form of religious communication, named communication of humankind. Unlike communication of power and descent, it is based on all humans having the same problem, and thus having access to being in a personal relation to the deity, enlightenment or similar.

The consequence of religion as *communication of humankind* is the sudden existence of religions where followers do not live in coherent and bordering societies. People can be Buddhists regardless of where they are situated, ethnical background, and political preferences. There might exist a minority adhering to one religion in a country where another religion constitutes the majority. This minority will then have double identities, with both a national and religious identity, with believers across the globe. And perhaps also relevant, it might separate them from the majority.

This cross-national identity where all share the same faith and often a common ritual of entry leads to *network communication* (Feldtkeller forthcoming:98). Typical for this is that believers name each other as family.

3 Methodology and Research Design

In this chapter I will discuss the research strategy and the methodological approach. In the first part I will draw the implications of the aim of the thesis and the implications of the theoretical discussion for the research design. Subsequently it is necessary to discuss the methodological approach before I define the final analytical framework and select the cases.

3.1 Research design

To be able to establish what happens when religion and separatism produces rebellion, I need to “open the black box” to access more fine-grained data and explain the causal chain (Elster 2007:32). Doing this I need to identify the phenomenon. As controlled experiments are not possible I will attempt to mimic the rigidity through a multi-layered design.

As the pattern is already established, and the question is what the mechanisms are, I apply a qualitative approach based on a comparative study of historical cases. Assuming that this pattern is real, this allows me to focus on the phenomenon. As it is a phenomenon where two concepts are combined with an unexpected effect, and to ensure the validity and reliability of the outcome, I select three cases that can inform the phenomenon from three different perspectives. With the number of cases, and the historical approach with open questions, I need to focus the analysis. This must be ensured through rigid application of theoretical categories.

Moving beyond established correlations, this study becomes *exploratory* in nature. This calls for a less structured approach (Silverman 2009:122). In essence I can formulate what I *expect* to find, but I do not know what I *will* find. Accepting religion as a second order phenomenon calls for an approach where I am open for it having multiple manifestations. After testing initial designs where I quantified the analytical framework, I found this to be an obstacle for adequately measuring religion. I therefore landed on a more dynamical approach where the theoretical categories form the basis for discussions.

In its essence this is a *comparative* study. As the aim is to identify what causes the difference in outcome the study is a most similar systems study. The cases therefore need to be as similar as possible. This is secured through the selection of cases. Table 1 summarizes the variables,

similarities and differences across the cases in their selection. From this point on the analytical framework and the questions becomes relevant.

Table 1: Variables and Similarity in Selected Cases

Indep. Var.	Case 1:	Case 2:	Case 3:
Religious minority	1	1	1
Similar religion	1	1	1
Repressed	1	1	1
Geographical proximity	1	1	1
Active Separatism	1	0	1
Dep. Var.: Conflict	1	0	0

It is important to underline that the approach is not a comparative study as such. After the statistical reproduction I apply elements from three different methodologies to identify the religion separatism-nexus.

The study has a comparative element in that it compares one phenomenon across three cases. Still, a *controlled comparative study*, as Mill described it, has strict requirements for the level of similarity and predefined variables (George and Bennett 2005:153-60). Doing an exploratory study on different conflicts, this becomes impossible. This is also a common criticism of this approach. Nevertheless, the inherent qualities of the approach have resulted in attempts at compensating for this rather than disclaiming it. One of these attempts is to combine the comparative approach with what is called *process tracing* (George and Bennett 2005:181,205-32). In process tracing, focus is on describing how historical events came to be and tracing the causal triggers for this event. The strength of this is that it does not imply that causal variables are explicitly defined prior to the study. Similar to what Elster defines as opening the *black box*, this approach allows me to do a historical tracing of the elements of the religion separatism-nexus. Still, it is not a strict process tracing. Defining religion as a second order phenomenon means that I have to assess a wide range of aspects that might affect the outcome. It is difficult to do this in the strict manner Elster (2007:33) exemplifies. Process tracing is a central aspect of the analysis of the individual cases, whereas the comparison evaluates and summarizes the conclusions from the three analyses. Analyzing mechanisms inside the black box Elster often applies *methodological individualism*. By this he emphasizes the focus on individuals as the building blocks of every political action.

Whereas the case studies include evaluations and actions of individual leaders, the statistical and theoretical approach from the group mobilization theory means the analysis will both begin and end with a focus on groups. The individual aspect is thus secondary and a consequence of the element of process tracing.

A third element, also an attempt at strengthening the comparative method, is the *congruence method*. This is a method whereby theory is used to explain variances between independent and dependent variables, and then predict a certain outcome. From consistency in the output the researcher can assess the validity of the theory (George and Bennett 2005:181-204). The congruent method is implemented in that I use theory to assume a certain relation between religion and separatism. I apply this to strengthen the overall analysis, as it both provides me with expectations in the cases, making it easier to make findings more explicit, as well as making the conclusion more concise. The methodology can thus be seen as existing between the comparative analysis, process tracing and Esters black box, and the congruence method.

Finally, the analysis implies a certain level of counterfactuality, as I basically ask why there isn't conflict where there is no. Counterfactual analyses can be justified, but they can also become too diffuse if they are not done rigorously enough. To balance this I will attempt to identify rebel-movements or incidents of conflict, which can serve as internal comparative perspectives for each case throughout, and especially in the two cases where there is no rebellion.

3.2 Analytical Framework

In the prior theoretical discussion I have argued why certain theoretical perspectives are relevant for this analysis. I will be applying group mobilization theory (Gurr 2000) in analyzing the development of rebellion, or the lack of such. To analyze the religious factor I will apply the theoretical framework presented in Feldtkellers' forthcoming *the global transformations of religion* and from *Kommunikationsstrukturen und Sozialformen von Religion* (Feldtkeller 2012). To do this the latter framework needs to be integrated into the first, focusing on how different aspects of religion can be expected to be found and identified as a part of the minority's *identity*, *opportunity* and *motive* to rebel.

3.2.1 Religion as Identity, Opportunity, and Motive

The concept of identity binds the minority together and separates them from the majority. Religion as a component of identity in this case therefore needs to reinforce this difference. The individuals of the minority need to be included by the religious identity, and the majority needs to be excluded. For ethnically distinct minorities the religious cleavage should reinforce the ethnic cleavage. For non-ethnically distinct religious minorities the religious identity is the central element of the difference in identity.

Explaining religion as a component of identities is not radical. Understood as a myth symbol-complex³, what religion does is to explain the role of the individual or group that adheres to the religion – who they are and how they are expected to act. (Feldtkeller forthcoming: 84) Many of the largest religions in the world have an exclusiveness clause, forcing rejection of other religions. Religions that claim to hold an absolute truth will also often in themselves be exclusive (Nordås 2010:122). Juergensmeyer (1993) emphasizes how the emotive dimension of religion, strengthened by a relationship to a divine force, leads to a stronger loyalty than in ideologies. Reynal-Querol, amongst others, sees religion to be a stronger identity factor than language and ethnicity (2002:29).

Feldtkellers theoretical framework will fit the identity category, but only some of his *forms of communication* are informing identity as defined above. These are religion as communication of *descent, power, and network*.

In most cases the concept of opportunity is identified with relative size, and in Fox' analysis and in the MAR-data the initial selection of the cases secure opportunity in form of the rule of inclusion (Fox 2004:719f; Davenport 2003:5; Nordås 2010:117). As the cases analyzed in this thesis are selected from the MAR-dataset fundamentally the criterion of *opportunity* is largely fulfilled. Still, as there are external factors relevant for opportunity, I will include the discussion of it. Religion can also be a part of the political power potential of the minority, offering organizational. Nordås emphasizes exactly this side of religion when she addresses the question of opportunity (Nordås 2010:122). I operationalize it as the extent to which the religion takes part in the recruiting of fighters, or similar. This category do not follow Feldtkellers' theoretical framework, but findings can be relevant in the light of his framework. Further, his categories will be discussed against potential opportunity factors.

³ Smith, J.: An explanation of how myths and symbols of nationalist movement ideologies affect the historical narrative of the group and the notion of right and wrong.

The concept of *motive* is related to repression and *relative deprivation* (Gurr 1970:24). If a minority perceives itself as deprived of central rights or opportunities, this deprivation can serve as a motive for rebellion. Motive can be identified with what in international relations theory commonly is called *Willingness* (Starr 1978 in Nordås 2010), and has to do with the context the minority finds itself in. *Relative deprivation* does not in itself imply repression, as deprivation could be imagined. However repression should in all cases lead to a sense of deprivation.

Analyzing religion as motive I need to first establish what reasons the minority have for developing relative deprivation. To define whether these can be considered religious I will discuss each case. Here the usage of the identity-narrative, the actors and what institutions they represent, and the level of religious rhetoric will be central. I will thus need to balance between narrow and inclusive definitions of religion. A politician can be a religious actor, but he need not be, only by claiming it.

From prior studies there are a range of ways religion can be expected to induce motive. Religion can be a *direct* motive for rebellion, as in cases of protection of the religious practice, or religious ethics arguing certain forms of violent action, Jihad, or the Christian Just War (Juergensmeyer 2003; Reichberg 2006). The concept of martyrdom can make fighting desirable for believers (Juergensmeyer 1993; Toft 2007). Religion can imply believers to act in a certain way (behavioral prescription). Religion often has non-negotiable requirements for how believers should live their lives, limiting the range of choices (Juergensmeyer 2003; Svensson 2007). Religion might shift the cost benefit-analysis, introducing infinitely high valuables. (Nordås 2010:125) *Civilizational rallying*, meaning support coming from religious kin abroad is emphasized by Huntington (1996:272) Even if the religious practice is not under threat (direct motive), non-religious issues can be turned into security-issues by religious authorities (Nordås 2010:126).

Summing up I find two tendencies regarding the religious potential for motive. The first tendency is that some of the described motives reflect *constant* phenomena within religions. These are theological concepts and dogma speaking to believers regardless of situation. The other tendency frames religions *non-constant* potential for motivation of conflict. These are contextual motives which do not reflect upon deeper theological, traditional dogma or self protection mechanisms, but has its root in the interpretational authority of religious

authorities, and how contemporary situations can be interpreted religiously. This echoes the Securitization theory of the Copenhagen School. (Buzan et.al 1998)

3.3 Methodological Challenges

This thesis addresses the dynamics of repressed religious minorities in developing rebellion as identified in the statistical studies of Fox (2001, 2004) and Nordås (2010). It is first and foremost an addition to these academic discourses, and must be seen in relation to these. It does not attempt to analyze religion and conflict in general, and can therefore *not* be generalized beyond the context of repressed religious minorities.

The study does not introduce any new information data on the cases. It is a reassessment of existing material. Leaning heavily on secondary sources, this thesis is highly dependent on the reliability of these. As all the cases have conflict of interests the evaluation of sources requires more attention; still the consensus within the academic discourse forms the basis for the analysis.

A further weakness is that focus is spread across three cases. This limits how deeply each case can be analyzed and how nuanced pictures can be presented. In summary, the middle way that is applied to bridge the two academic trends also represents challenges.

Finally, as I am not including the full set of *at-risk factors* from the MAR-project a reasonable criticism is that this study is selective. This is partly true, but also largely non-valid. By selecting cases based on *at-risk*, I would attempt an enhancement of the *at-risk* indicators. This is not what I set out to do. My questions are related to the religion separatism-nexus, not the at-risk factor.

3.4 Validity, Reliability and Bias

The strengths and weaknesses of case studies is directly opposite of statistical studies. For concepts that are difficult to measure case studies generally have a higher validity. (George and Bennett 2005:19). For this reason, and because of its strengths in identifying causal complexity, this approach is adapted. The inherent trade-off between qualitative and quantitative approaches relates to the generalizability and the internal validity. Whereas the case studies have a high level of internal validity, the generalizability, and external validity, is

attempted to be secured by linking the case selection to, and mimicking the framework of the statistical studies (George and Bennett 2005:20-2). This linking is also done to secure two other aspects. One criticism held against case studies is that the case selection is easily biased. This affects the outcome and reduces the validity of the conclusions. By selecting cases through statistical replication these aspects are reduced thereby strengthening external validity and reducing bias (George and Bennett 2005:23).

The reliability of the study is linked to two aspects. Given the focus on three cases the analysis becomes highly dependent on secondary sources. Reliability *is* dependent on the reliability and the use of these. This makes it necessary to put an effort into evaluating the overall literature of the cases. Secondly, reliability is dependent on the religion separatism-pattern being real rather than a product of statistical error. This is something I simply have to rely on, and leave for future studies to decide upon.

3.5 Ethical Considerations

As this thesis is handed in at the University of Oslo I chose to use the official ethical guidelines applying to this institution.

Leaning heavily on secondary sources I need to be careful when it comes to honesty regarding the use of sources, ideas, and referencing (NESH 2010:25-7). Further I need to be humble in the light of the fact that I am studying cultures I cannot fully understand. Still, I will emphasize to correct this throughout the case studies (NESH 2010:24).

Finally I need to be sensitive towards the fact that the issues under investigation are conflicts. On one hand I have to be careful not to label parties unfairly, and on the other be sensitive towards bias in the literature.

3.6 Selection of Cases

Because the pattern under investigation is identified in statistical research I will base the selection of cases on a replication of the analyses on the same data. Apart from making it possible to investigate cases from the exact pattern identified, this form of selection also allows for selection without theoretical or observational bias.

The replication of the statistical analysis is based in the MAR-dataset. This dataset also offers a qualitative résumé of minorities, which makes it possible to both evaluate the quantitative coding. Nordås' analysis will serve as a reference for the selected cases.

Fox' analyses data from 1996-2000 and 1991-1994. I will look at the same period, but for practical purposes of this thesis will limit the selection to 1996-2000.

There are a number of either miss-coded units or categorizations which can be discussed in the MAR-dataset. Whether they are a product of random error or ambiguousness regarding categorizations, it becomes necessary to evaluate the data. Because the analysis is based on a replication of prior studies it is important not to change the data before the replication. This needs to be done as correctly as possible, as any present miss-coding also was part of the initial analysis. The qualitative nature of this analysis however, calls for critical discussions of how the variables in the data.

3.6.1 Property of the Cases


In accordance to Table 1 the cases should have the following properties. Case 1 must have active separatism and have a high level of rebellion, to inform the analysis regarding the *normal* conflict pattern.

Case 2 cannot have active separatist movements nor be engaged in political violence. This case can inform the analysis of how religion can be expected to function when not affected by separatism.

Case 3 must have an active separatist movement but not be engaged in political violence. This case can confirm tendencies identified in the above cases. Further, informs the analysis of reliability of the outcome, making it critical for the thesis.

The cases are presented in Figure 1, in accordance to the theoretical and statistical expectancies along three axes (religious difference, conflict intensity (level of rebellion) and level of separatism).

Figure 1: Minorities with members under unprovoked repression



3.6.2 Statistical Replication

In the replication of Fox's analysis of the MAR-data, I tested for difference in minority-majority-religions, level of rebellion, and form of repression. First I produced a list of minorities with high levels of rebellion (5-7) and religious difference (3). The observed unit is conflict/year, meaning each year with observed rebellion constitutes one line on the list. I did not test for active separatism as, according to Fox (2000a), all minorities would have this trait. The replication does confirm this pattern. Only one case is coded without an active separatist movement, the Chechen minority in Russia. I argue that this is either a miscoding, or one that does not reflect reality, as this conflict is generally understood to be a separatist conflict (Appendix II). In total there were 26 conflict/years, and 9 minorities represented. As the minority should have an as high conflict intensity as possible I chose to focus on the 5 minorities with more than one conflict/year: The Chechen Sunni minority in Christian Orthodox Russia, the Kashmiri Sunni minority in primarily Hindu India, the Moro Sunni minority in Catholic Philippines, the Southern Animist/Christian minority in Muslim Sudan, and the Tamil Hindu minority in Buddhist Sri Lanka. Categorizing religious salience in the above conflicts between 2000 and 2004 according to *Issues, Parties and Rhetoric*, Nordås has defined the Chechen, Kashmiri, and Tamil conflicts as religion being a minor issue, whereas the conflicts in Southern Sudan and Philippine Mindanao are defined as having religion as major issue (Nordås 2010:235,28).

To identify the two minorities *without* violent conflict I sorted the cases in the MAR-data for religious difference (3) and low levels of rebellion (0). Based on this selection I made a scatter-plot, indicating level of separatism and repression. (Appendix I). I repeated this routine for all 7 forms of measured repression reported. To range the level of repression I summed the number of repression/years for each minority. This resulted in two lists, one ranging minorities with no separatism (B), and one minorities with active separatism (A). For representativeness I exclude minorities with only one repression/year.

There are a total of four minorities with active separatism and more than one repression/year: Maronite Christians in Lebanon, Zomis (Chins) in Burma, Baha'i in Iran, and Rohingya (Arakanese) Muslims in Burma. In the case of the latter two, repression is not unprovoked but ambiguous. They are included to secure representativeness in the selection, but if these cases are to be selected it needs to be further argued.


There are a total of four minorities with no separatism and more than one repression/year: Copts in Egypt, Amhara in Ethiopia, Christians in Iran, and Ogani in Nigeria. As with the list above the repression of the latter two minorities are ambiguous. If these cases are to be selected it needs to be further argued.

3.6.3 Geographical Distribution and Comparability of Cases

As seen in Figure 2, Western Africa only has one case, the Nigerian Ogoni. This is an ambiguously repressed minority, and there are primarily economical motivations for repression in form of displacement. (Minorities at Risk 2009:*Ogoni*)

In the extended area of North-Africa and the Middle East there are six cases, and all forms of cases are represented. Southerners in Sudan have a level of rebellion peaking at 7 for all 5 years. They are coded as Animists in the dataset, but Christianity is central in the conflict. The number of Christians can be discussed, but religious issues are a major part of this conflict, (Nordås 2010:235) and there *is* a Christian minority in the South which successfully has given a language to the conflict. One can therefore speak of a repressed Christian minority in the South which has responded with rebellion.

Figure 2: Geographical distribution of potential cases⁴



The Egyptian Coptic minority has no rebel movements, nor registered separatist movements and has one of the highest repression/years of the selection. As with the Southerners of Sudan they are also a Christian minority in a Muslim society. The repression of the Amhara is ambiguous having only 2 repression years and is in addition a ruling minority. As a non-separatist minority I therefore argue the Copts in Egypt is a *better* case.

The Maronites are also a ruling minority, but score relatively high on repression/year (2) for minorities with active separatist movements and no rebellion. They are also considered to have several factors putting them at risk for rebellion. (Davenport 2003) As a relatively small minority with constitutionally guaranteed influence it is easy to guess why Maronites do not rebel. Still, they fulfill the criteria for being chosen, and *is* a part of Fox' analysis. Other cases need to be evaluated, but ignoring this case based on initial impression will result in biased case selection. This specific pattern might be what signifies repressed, separatist, religious minorities not rebelling.

In Iran there are two cases, the Christians who do not have active separatism, and the Baha'i where separatism is present. The repression is high but ambiguous, as *both* politically active and non-politically active are targeted. In addition to this ambiguity the minorities are in one state. If two of three cases are from the same state I hold it to be a risk that the analysis will be

⁴ Corresponds to figure 1: *Blue* cases represent conflicts, *green* represents minorities without separatism, and *red* cases represents minorities with active separatism.

overtly colored by the politics of that state. This suspicion is strengthened by the fact that these minorities seem to be under a similar and distinct pattern of repression, suggesting a specific strategy. Lastly the high level of oppression in both cases might in itself suggest why there is no rebellion. This is, as with the Maronites, no reason not to select this minority, but it makes Maronites and Copts better cases for comparison.

The Chechen Sunni minority in Russia is a minority with full conflict level throughout the five year period. The conflict can be termed religious, even though only to some extent. (Nordås 2010:235) However, the only other conflict between a Christian majority and a Moslem minority is the Moro in the Philippines'. As both are cases with high conflict intensity they are not suitable for comparison.

The final four cases are in Southern Asia. The arguments for the Iranian cases are also relevant for the Burmese cases. Further, there are no repressed religious minorities without active separatism in the same area. The last argument is equally valid for the case on Sri Lanka and in northern India.

On the basis of this I conclude that the cases best fitted for comparison are Christian minorities in Muslim, Arab states: Sudanese Southerners, Egyptian Copts, and Lebanese Maronites.

4 Analysis

Analyzing the selected cases through the lens of the analytical framework I will apply a five-step strategy. First I will introduce the cases focusing on issues and actors and defining the beginning of the conflict. Secondly I will give an outline of the roots of the conflict and the period leading up to it. Thirdly I will give a historical résumé of the conflict itself. In the fourth part I thematically describe the role religion has played and how it has reacted to the conflict. In the fifth part I will use the above résumés and the analytical framework to discuss how religion has played a part in the identity, opportunity and motive for rebellion. In the end of each case I will draw the essence of the analysis in a conclusion for each case. In line with the argumentation for the property of the different cases I begin by analyzing the Southerners in Sudan, followed by the Egyptian Copts and finally the Lebanese Maronites.

4.1 The Southerners of Sudan: Issues and Actors

Until the recent Southern independence, Sudan was the largest country on the continent of Africa. Occupying a strategic position on the Horn of Africa, bordering many of Africa's largest countries, rich in natural resources, and having been colonized by several empires has made it a victim of strategic regional and geo-political shifts throughout its history. (Martin 2005a:23) At the same time both ethnic and religious differences are central issues in the conflicts.

The North can best be understood as part of the North-Africa Middle-East area. Its population is understood to have an Arabic descent, adhering to Islam and speaking Arabic. The Southern population is ethnically distinct from the Northerners, and understood to belong to the sub-Saharan African cultures. Though most speak Arabic, all ethnic groups have their own local languages, tribal religions and cultures, and can be categorized under the umbrella African traditional religion (ATR). Identifying the Southern as one group is rather imprecise. It is a large area with many cultures, tribes, languages and forms of ATR. During British indirect rule, the South was deliberately segregated from the North in educational, legal and local governmental matters. This led to less contact between Northerners and Southerners, and has been understood as one of the reasons for the failure of the construction of a unified national identity after the independence in 1956 (Johnson 2006:xvif). In the North the national identity has been based in Arab language and Islam. Resurgence of military resistance from

the South has throughout the 20th century gone hand in hand with repression and implementation of Islamist reforms in the South.

After 1956 Christianity was only a minority religion in the South, associated with the educated and mostly viewed as a part of the oppression, distinctly framed in Hutchinson's (1996:318) quote "the British left with their God". (Beshir 1968:6) But as missionaries were expelled and churches became targeted to an increasingly extent throughout the 1960s and 1980s by Khartoum, Christianity became a religion of the oppressed South, making it a religious conflict (Johnson 2006:31). In short, Islamistic politics of Khartoum at the same time targeting church institutions and Southern rebels has made Christianity a viable unifying identity for the Southern Sudanese. ATR also played an important role, with a predominant part of the population adhering to ATR, but the two play different parts in the conflict. Because of this both will be discussed in the analysis.

There are many times in history one can start a historical résumé, but as the focus of this study is the 1990s, I find it natural to draw the historical lines back to the beginning of the Second Civil war in the early 1980s, and give a résumé of the First Civil War, as the background.

4.1.1 The First Civil War and the Addis Ababa Agreement: 1958-1972

Under the Anglo-Egyptian condominium, the South had been kept isolated to protect it from Northern exploitation. In the process of de-colonization this protective separation was intended to be upheld by implementing a federal, rather than a unitary constitution. But in the haste to de-colonize Sudan, the British granted independence before the final system was chosen. After the first election in 1954⁵ the Southern federal party received close to all votes from the South. Within a constitutional democracy this could have led to an increased self-determination for the South, but the military coup in 1958 left all possibilities for a democratic solution of the issue dead for a long period (Johnson 2006:28).

The outbreak of the first civil war is generally considered to have begun already prior to the independence with the 1955 mutiny of a military garrison in Torit. The reason for the mutiny was dissatisfaction over the de-colonization process. The mutineers felt Southerners were not included in the new political system, and that rule over the South was simply handed over to

⁵ The first election was held two years prior to the independence in 1956

northern Arabian nationalists. They were followed by other garrisons settling on the other side of the Ugandan border, but were too weak to pose a threat in the region.⁶ Only after General Abbud led the military coup in 1958, and through following politics of Islamization of the South, did the conflict grow into a civil war (Rolandsen 2005:24-25).

The new politics from Khartoum were a result of a change in the Northern nationalism. Inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood religion was moved into the political scene with the forming of the National Islamic Front. Throughout the 1950s the North was dominated by sectarian politics and the idea that Arabization and Islamization were necessities for the creation of a national unity (Johnson 2006:35). It was these political ideas General Abbud set into action after 1958. The changes focused on education, transferring missionary schools into state schools, and changing the language of instruction from English to Arabic. Missionary activities were restricted, and finally evicted in 1964 (Johnson 2006:30). As a reaction to this the Southern educated elite joined forces with the military mutineers and formed the Sudan African Nationalist Union (SANU) with the military branch *Anyana*⁷ (Johnson 2006:31).

SANU united the Southern rebels from its formation until the military regime was replaced by a civilian and more moderate regime in 1964, which worked for a *political* solution to the conflict. The different fractions met at the Roundtable conference in Khartoum 1965 hosted by the new regime. But disagreement within SANU regarding how to meet this new regime led to fractionalization of the movement – one radical settling outside Sudan, and one more moderate settling inside (Johnson 2006:32). Both ‘exile’ and ‘inside’ SANU were weakened towards the end of the 1960s and the conflict was settled in the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972, where promises were made to grant the Southern regions more self-determination, and financial support. These promises were not kept by Khartoum, and throughout the 1970s the basis for the peace disintegrated (Rolandsen 2005:25).

Through this period there is recorded a paradoxically change in the Southerners attitude towards Christianity. In the Catholic churches of Torit and Isoke church membership are recorded to have trebled over a four-year period, and in the Southern Blue Nile region conversion to the local churches increased after the missionaries were expelled in 1964 (Lundström 1990:1991; James 1988:241-52 in Johnson 2006:31; Rolandsen 2005:76).

⁶ The identification of the mutineers as Southerners is a bit imprecise. Most mutinies happened in Equatoria, and the rebels had little support from the Nuer and Dinka (Johnson 2006:28).

⁷ The *Anyana*, named after a form of snake venom, is in some literature mentioned as Anya-Nya (Bashir 1968).

Whereas churches in the South during the Condominium were perceived to collaborate with the colonial powers, the status of the church through the 1960s led to it becoming part of Southern resistance (Johnson 2005:35).

4.1.2 The Second Civil War and Beyond: 1983-2005

During the relative calmness and optimism following the Addis Ababa Agreement, there was no major fighting. Still, *Anyana* soldiers remained a dormant factor on the Ethiopian side of the border (Rolandsen 2005:26). Several factors are central in the resurgence of conflict in Southern Sudan: First of all, the growing Islamist politics from Khartoum, and implementation of Sharia as the public law of Sudan in 1983 (Al-Na'im 1993:26). Ideologically inspired by Iraqi and Libyan socialist Arabism, the Sudanese government propagated Arabism against the Southern non-Muslim population (Hunwick 1993:4). This resulted in growing alienation, tension, and violent clashes in the South. In addition the same pattern of church growth from first civil war repeated itself in the early 1980s and 1990s (Johnson 2006:35). This led to stronger church organizations and more Christians in Southern Sudan. There were also growing dissatisfaction among Southerners regarding the dishonored peace-agreement. Once again there were mutineers in different garrisons that fled to the borders forming guerillas. This tendency was strengthened when government supported Baqqara militias began raiding Dinka and Nuer villages in late 1970s early 1980s to make room for oil wells (Johnson 2006:44; Hutchinson 2001:312). International alliances were also making the Southern rebels stronger. The 1967 Arab-Israeli war established Israel as an alliance, and Southerners could from the 1970s rely on the support of Uganda. The government in Khartoum chose to support Eritrean secessionists in Ethiopia. As a strategic response to this, the Ethiopian regime began heavily supporting the *Anyana*⁸ soldiers residing along the borders to destabilize Sudan (Johnson 2006:36-37). Col. Garang, a Dinka officer of the army, was sent by Khartoum to mediate with the rebels. But choosing to join, he after a few years became the leader of the movement, which took the name Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement or Army (SPLM/A) (Rolandsen 2005:26-27).

From 1985 to 1991 SPLM/A gradually became the dominant rebel movement in the South, with Garang as its undisputed leader. After several military successes they controlled major regions and cities throughout the region (Rolandsen 2005:29). However, in late summer 1991

⁸ From this period named *Anyana II*

three high-ranking Nuer and Shilluk SPLM/A leaders attempted a coup. They might have succeeded, but choosing to play on ethnicity probably made them lose support from the predominantly Dinka leadership of the SPLM/A (Rolandsen 2005:35-36). This defeat led to the forming of the faction named SPLA-Nasir. The focus on ethnic differences, primarily between the Dinka and the Nuer, would split the Southern opposition and lead to a separate civil war between the Dinka and Nuer that lasted until 1999 (Hutchinson 2001:308). Characterized by focus on ethnic differences, much supports the interpretation that this conflict was a result of the disagreements between Garang and the factionalists (Hutchinson 2001:319-21). Indeed the Dinka and Nuer themselves have in retrospect made this explicit, by underlining this conflict as *the war of the educated*, not the Nuer and Dinka (Hutchinson 2001:324).

The organizational implication of the attempted coup was large. Instead of one organization there were two competing organizations fighting each other. In an attempt to gain momentum, the Nasir faction went into a tactical alliance with Khartoum, and further fractionalization of the SPLM/A led more leaders to join the Nasir-faction in 1993. Creating SPLM/A-united, they joined military forces against Garang's SPLM/A (Rolandsen 2005:37). In addition the fall of Mengistu in Ethiopia, led to the SPLM/A losing both military strength and territorial ground. Both through negotiations and in relation to foreign NGOs and governments Garang's SPLM/A had to fight for a repositioning as the natural representative of the Southern population (Rolandsen 2005:38). Isolated in Southern Equatoria, and having to change tactics to protracted warfare, it became difficult to dismiss demands for reformation. To gain legitimacy among foreign NGOs, countries, and the Southern elite, SPLM/A chose to organize a National Convention (NC) with representatives from all of Southern Sudan. The goal of this was to introduce plans for a systematical governing of the South. There are several ways to interpret the convention that was held in Chukudum, April 1994. One is that it only was *pro forma*, meant to impress. (Rolandsen 2005:81-82) According to Rolandsen much points to this being correct, but regardless of the realities, the meeting served its purpose as a legitimizing of Garang's SPLM/A. As a result the SPLM/A went through political renewal, equipping it with civil structures. It strengthened SPLM/A leaderships claim to represent all of Southern Sudan, and brought SPLM/A closer to a separatist agenda. (Rolandsen 2005:122-3)

Whereas the SPLM/A had been experiencing setbacks from 1992-1994, the government in Khartoum had experienced military and strategic success. Through negotiations they had marginalize SPLM/A, troops had retaken land, and a relative stabile alliance with the Nasir-faction was established. Resistance seemed to be crumbling (Rolandsen 2005:125). However, from 1994, and much because of the NC, this situation changed dramatically.

After 1995 most of the SPLM/A-united factions had disintegrated into warlords, and the competition for hegemony was largely over (Rolandsen 2005:133). From 1995-97, with a remarkably fast resurrection of its military machine and support from the Eritrean army, SPLM/A managed to recapture most of the lost land. The government in Khartoum on the other hand became increasingly isolated both regionally and internationally. Neighboring governments became aware of Sudanese support of guerillas in Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea; and Western governments increasingly regarded Sudan as a terrorist state, harboring Islamist terrorists. Bashir's constant calls for *jihad* against the South gave SPLM/A the opportunity to promote the conflict as religious, winning sympathy from the West. The SPLM/A military campaign lost momentum in 1998, but by the end of the decade no areas remained loyal to the Nasir-faction (Rolandsen 2005:124-125).

From 1997-99 an oil line was constructed from the wells of Southern Sudan to Port Sudan. The Khartoum government directed this new income towards getting an edge in the conflict. Throughout the beginning of the following decade, oil and the position the Khartoum government assumed in the US *war on terror*, lead to less isolation from Western countries (Rolandsen 2005:128). Nonetheless, this development did not change the conflict dynamics drastically, as from 2002 a peace-treaty was signed, followed by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, paving the way for Southern independence (Grawert 2010:1).

4.1.3 Religion in the Conflict: Responses and Shifts

There are several ways religion can be relevant in the conflict dynamics. Different religions have different ways of working in the conflict, and different actors use religion in different ways. One central function of ATR in Southern Sudan is to settle conflicts involving homicide. During the second civil war this became increasingly difficult for two reasons. A necessity for settling conflict including homicide involves identification of the perpetrator. Traditionally done by identifying who the spear used belonged to, this became impossible after introduction of guns. After the perpetrator was identified compensation was paid to the

offended clan (*gol*), a religious ceremony (*cuil*) was held by the religious leader (*bany bith* or *kuor kwac*). Both compensation and the ritual are necessary to make sure God (*kuoth nhial*) did not revenge the wrongdoing. The conflict between the Nuer and Dinka, which was traditionally present in a smaller scale, became hard to settle in traditional manners, with no unifying religious authority within traditional structures (Tier 2005:60ff).

During the early 1980s, when Baqqara tribes raided Nuer and Dinka areas, ATR played a different role (Hutchinson 2001:312). As these used guns, they remained anonymous. In an attempt to categorize and handle the extreme violence these deaths in the religious framework of local ATR, the victims received the status of people struck by lightning (*col wic*) (Hutchinson 2001:312). Under normal circumstances death is considered final amongst Nuer and Dinka, but a person struck dead by lightning is considered blessed by God and ‘taken up to the skies’. The *col wic* is to receive a post-mortem wife and child that would maintain the link to the clan. The *col wic* would protect members of the clan, especially against gunfire (Hutchinson 2001:313). This phenomenon was rare before the 1980s, but after the link between lightning and gunshots were made, more people felt protected, resulting in more bravery in resistance against Northerners (Hutchinson 2001:313).

Machar, a Nuer SPLM/A leader and a baptized Presbyterian, heard about this distinction being given to people killed by gunshots. In an attempt to make fighting in the war against the North more acceptable he introduced a distinction between *government war* (*koor kume*) and *inter-communal war* (*koor cieng*) that changed the status of homicide, and freed the Nuer fighters from spiritual consequences of murder (Hutchinson 2001:313-16). This was adopted and worked to serve his goal. Later the Nuer and Dinka tribal leaders further developed this. Towards the end of the Dinka Nuer conflict there was reported a distinction between *government war* and *war of the educated* (the Nuer Dinka-conflict). Through this distinction, the conflict was reframed as the conflict of someone else (Hutchinson 2001:319). Machars’ initial distinctions also led to a general de-personalization and secularizing of the conflict. Hutchinson (2001:316) believes this led to “the remarkable religious efflorescence that followed”.

The leaders of the SPLM/A, even though belonging to the educated elite, do not appear to wish for a specifically Christian constitution. Rather opposite the SPLM/A has maintained great skepticism to church organizations, and emphasizing a secular constitution (Rolandsen 2005:127; Hutchinson 2001:307,326).

During the first years of the SPLM/A the churches, united under the Khartoum based Sudan Council of Churches (SCC), were viewed with skepticism by the movement. But as the SCC split, due to inability to function from Khartoum, and the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC) was formed in the South, the relationship improved (Rolandsen 2005:30). NSCC was an ecumenical organization with an agenda to explicitly advocate human rights. It was to promote “unity, equality and peace among the diverse people of Southern Sudan” (Agurame 2009:44; Rolandsen 2005:75). From 1991-97 the SPLM/A saw NSCC more as a competitor than anything else, but in 1997 NSCC initiated a reconciliation dialogue with SPLM/A. This meeting resulted in increased trust between the parties, and became instrumental for the people-to-people peace program, where the church was an active facilitator (Rolandsen 2005:130-131). The NSCC has also been instrumental in the distribution of aid throughout the period of analysis. Foreign NGO’s have at times trusted the NSCC more than the SPLM/A. The distribution was not always as efficient as thought, but for SPLM/A the collaboration with NSCC regarding foreign aid probably gave access to more aid. There is also a high probability that the link made it easier for the SPLM/A to evoke empathy among Western countries, especially in the US where the Christian lobby has kept the conflict on the political agenda (Smith 2005:61; Johnson 2006:177).

One of the most important dialogues facilitated by the NSCC was a dialogue between Nuer and Dinka leaders, ending their conflict in 1999. The conference opened with the “sacrifice of the White Bull (*Mabior Thon/Tu-bor*)”, a Nuer and Dinka tradition to lead the ghosts of deceased to wherever they should reside, and “sealed the covenant with the Christian worship” (Tier 2005:97-99). This worked as a ritualization emphasizing the different religious and ethnic traditions being unified in peace under the Christian umbrella. It also found an echo in the Nuer prophecies, that one day all of the South would be united as one people (Hutchinson 2001).

In the beginning of the 20th century there appeared what is called Nuer and Dinka prophets, playing both religious and political roles. The prophets did not fit into the tribal structure, and did not adhere to ATR divinities, but divinity in general (Sanderson 1981:5). Some prophets even propagated acceptance of Christianity in the South (Hutchinson 2001:317). Still, they must be understood as a separate religious phenomenon appearing within Nilotic cultures of South Sudan. Throughout the later 1980-90s these have been interpreted as having foretold the future of Southern Sudan (Hutchinson 2001:317,326). Supposedly there would come a

war where Southern tribes would fight each other before they would free themselves of Northern Arab rule (Johnson 1994:336-338).

Throughout the same period Southerners has to an increasingly extent started to view the war as a “curse from [the Christian] God” (Hutchinson 2001:325), where Southerners are being punished for accepting Christianity too slowly. This narrative, along with the peace oriented NSCC, Nuer prophets, and the lack of ATR mechanisms to successfully deal with the conflict, initiated the shift in the religious landscape of the South.

4.1.4 Religion as Identity

Common descent is throughout ATR seen as a guarantor of the wholeness of reality. When a person is murdered by someone, it is the clan that is entitled to the compensation. Likewise, when two people fight it becomes an issue between the clans. Further, the *col wic*, being central in the cosmology of the Dinka and Nuer, has a link only to the clan he belonged to as a living. Some clans even have their own myths of creation. There is a culture and language-identity across different clans forming the basis of the general distinction between Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk, etc. Some of these groups, such as the Shilluk, have a notion of a central power and a common identity, but there is no sign of the Southerners being able to use ATR to create a unified identity.

There are few power structures that have a religious significance. The first two decades of the Anglo-Egyptian condominium the British searched for a local political structure but concluded that the Southerners, apart from some cultures, were close to anarchistic. To compensate they tried to introduce these, but even today these do not have a religious significance. Religion as network communication has little relevance. There is a sense of us and the other based in the fact that the Southerners adhere to ATR and the Northerners to Islam, but this has not been able to create a common identity and rather forms the basis of inter-communal conflict between the Dinka and Nuer.

As a conclusion I only find ATR to offer an identity based on descent. This identity is not very unifying, but rather fractioned as the basic unit of descent is the clan.

Christianity does not offer an identity based on descent. Nevertheless, Christianity has been emphasized as a possible unifying factor, but this has more to do with the creation of a network where the common faith unites the different tribes of the South.

Similar to ATR Christianity in Sudan justifies no power structures. Rather, the importance of ecumenical organizations serves to underline the argument above, that Christianity in Sudan almost exclusively offers a network identity.

Referring to the historical résumé there are some other narratives that are relevant in relation to a Southern identity. The SPLM/A has insisted on a secular national identity. This had support in the leadership of the organization, but the way leaders manipulated and applied religious narratives and distinctions shows how important religions were, both to the population and to get the support from foreign states.

4.1.5 Religion as Opportunity

The opportunity to rebel has as mentioned more to do with mercantile factors. Naturally both the geographical concentration and the effective organization of the SPLM/A, supported by neighboring countries, are the most central. Still there are ways in which religion has represent opportunity.

Regarding ATR, the introduction of distinctions between different forms of war altered the status of homicide. SPLM/A chose to collaborate with NSCC rather reluctantly to get aid they probably would not have received otherwise. SPLM/A's emphasis of Christianity as response to Bashir's calls for *jihad* increased the international support for the Southern cause. These examples can in line with the Israeli alliance be seen as a political implementation of religion to gain an edge.

4.1.6 Religion as Motive

Leaning on the historical résumé, Southerners feel deprived of autonomy from the establishment of the modern Sudan in 1956. Autonomy was again promised in the Addis Ababa agreement in 1972, but as the agreement was not fulfilled a sense of deprivation based on lack of autonomy reemerged in the beginning of the 1980s. The strategy chosen by the North in relation to the oil-wells in the South also underpins this sense of deprivation.

The enforcement of Islamic reforms in the South caused cultural grievances including religion. Whether religion was at the core of this grievance, or simply resistance against what was perceived as Northern colonialism is hard to define, but religion became part of the resistance as Christianity offered itself as a symbol of the repressed.

Central in the Southerners felt deprivation is the lack of autonomy. This has to do with the separatism. In the beginning of the second civil war this was not religiously founded, but rather political in a secular sense. As argued above the political leaders of the SPLM/A seemed to apply religion when it suited their needs. ATR seems to have been adopted by parts of the population to explain and cope with the situation, and Christianity through NSCC seems to have argued pacific responses.

There might have been several reasons for why so many Southerners chose to become Christian. First of all there were reasons that allowed it to happen, or pull-reasons. Among these were the Nuer and Dinka Prophets. The push-reasons can be categorized as both hard and soft ones. Among hard reasons Christianity offered stronger alliances than ATR. Among soft reasons I would emphasize that Christianity in becoming repressed captured the narrative of the repressed population better. All of these points towards the reality that Christianity was chosen after repression. The population felt deprived, and the repression was very obvious and needed to be dealt with. This awoke a claim for greater autonomy. The fact that Christianity also was repressed, and that it communicated a unified identity different from the North, made it acceptable. It therefore seems to have been chosen because it supported separatism rather than being a reason for separatism as it was. Religion was thus not central for the onset of the conflict, but it offers legitimization of the identity of the Southerners, which again is necessary for a motive.

4.1.7 Summary Discussion: The New Found Identity

Throughout Southern Sudan there are a range of actors and narratives. Some stand out, and in focusing on these a number of conclusions can be drawn regarding the role of religion in the conflict.

Religious life in the South can be split into two main factions, ATR and Christianity. These two follow according to Sundermeier different forms of religion, ATR being primary and Christianity being secondary religion. A parallel this is found in Feldtkeller's framework, where ATR reflects identity based on *descent*, and Christianity reflects *network* communication. None of the two justify a *power* structure.

From this, one observation is of interest. The identity communicated in ATR is a very fractioned one. One can find creation-myths specifically for units down to one clan (*gol*), and

there are several different groups of tribes, with different languages, cultures and versions of ATR. All in all the identity offered by the religious narratives are highly fractioned and have not offered the Southerners a common identity.

It is therefore interesting to see the Southerners increasingly turn to Christianity. This can be seen as a result of several factors. In the face of growing repression from Khartoum, the Southerners began to identify with Christianity, probably as the religion of the repressed. Having become acceptable, it has also been framed as the religion that will create unity among the Southerners, and in the end peace. This process has been strengthened by the religious narrative that the war is a punishment from God, a church organization that is active in aid distribution, and ATR partially failing to solve internal conflicts by traditional means.

As a parallel to communication of descent Christianity offers network communication. Through this a common identity across the South in opposition to the Muslim North is enabled, giving support to the claim of independence. As the network also includes Western Christians, support can be expected, and has been provided.

This support has become important as opportunity. It has not necessarily been in the form of arms or soldiers. A significant amount of aid has been channeled to the South on the basis of its people's identity as Christians.

Between two actors that can be said to provide a Southern Unity–SLPM/A and NSCC—very different approaches have been chosen regarding how to face the repression. Neither of them has been able to neglect the repression; the politics of Khartoum have been so clear that one can talk of a relative deprivation perceived by both. However there is one central difference between the two actors. SPLM/A has chosen to respond with rebellion, and NSCC has chosen to respond with propagating Human Rights and negotiation. In an attempt at explaining this I suggest that the reason can be found partially in the difference of identity and ideology between the two. SPLM/A was a distinctly nationalistic political movement/militia developed as a response to repression. NSCC was formed as a response to the problems for SCC to function in the South. NSCC had a strictly Southern mission, working for the Southerners. However they were not focused on Southern nationalistic ideas. In 2007, after the situation had calmed, NSCC remerged with SCC. Pointing back to the initial argument: The Christianity of Southern Sudan does not emphasize religiously argued *descent* or *power*, but score high on *network* communication. In line with this a situation was seen where individuals

were not allowed to pursue their religious practice. This called for a special focus, but when the situation was eased, the network justified a reemerging of the two – and following, their identity was not Southern in the same way as SPLM/A. The identity of Sudanese Christianity is therefore non-Sudanese. The application of religion from SPLM/A is tolerable as it supports their claim to be a separate identity. The network identity establishes a form of identity with other countries, but the context of South against North makes the identity supportive of separatism. It also emphasizes the sense of deprivation in that they do not belong in Sudan, making secession the only viable outcome.

4.2 The Copts in Egypt: Issues and Actors

In the wake of the recent Egyptian Revolution, the conflict between the Coptic minority and the Muslim majority has gained new attention. Even though violence has been kept at a minimum at times, and reemerged when such when extremist Islamist ideology was given room to grow, a certain level of repression has been present throughout the history of modern Egypt. Remarkably, from a comparative perspective, the Coptic minority has chosen not to react with anything more severe than minor forms of protest. Highly dependent on the pacific rhetoric of Patriarch Shenouda III⁹, it still remains paradoxical why the Copts have not rebelled or protested more intensely than they have.

The Coptic minority in Egypt is a religious minority that according to different estimates constitutes 5-12% of the Egyptian population, and is the largest in the Middle East, counting between 4 and 8 million members. Copts does not reside in a unified area of Egypt, but have a higher concentration around some cities. They are not ethnically distinct but share many cultural traits and identity markers with the Muslim majority (Van Doorn-Harder 2005:24; Rowe 2005:89; Smith 2005:64).

The central issue in the conflict dynamics is the repression of the Coptic minority. While Copts understand themselves to be an integrated part of the Egyptian society, a growing alienation of Copts has led to strengthening of Coptic organizations and culture. This alienation is based on difference in perception of what defines being Egyptian. This has

⁹ The literature operates with several ways of titling and writing his name. Both Shenuda, Shanuda and Shenouda is used, and in addition to Patriarch, both Archbishop and Pope is used. I have chosen to use the name Shenouda as I have found it to be in use most often. The Coptic Church most often uses Pope as the title, but the literature use both patriarch and archbishop. As Pope is more loaded in English terminology, and in this case has the same meaning as patriarch I chose, in line with the literature to use 'patriarch'.

primarily resulted in riots and non-governmental violence—but the government has showed little interest in stopping these incidents, and the inter-communal clashes still remain an issue.

The Coptic Patriarch, the undisputed minority hegemon and political leader throughout the period of analysis, has insisted on the Copts *not* being a minority. This has been the basis for arguing non-violent responses, strengthened religious practices, political dialogue, and de-emphasizing the importance of any repression. In strong contrast to this, stands the response of the Western Coptic diaspora. A large proportion of today's Copts are living in diaspora¹⁰, and especially the diaspora in USA has framed Copts as a repressed minority, and have lobbied for the US government to take action. On the basis of this, I will use the US diaspora as an intra-case comparative aspect in the analysis, especially when it comes to defining potential relative deprivation.

The conflict dynamics as described above can be said to have its roots back to the 1922 independence and the shifts in Muslim Egyptian identity that occurred after the 1967 Israeli-Arab war. As there are no open conflict it is hard to put a date later than this, based on the repression. Nevertheless, the different regimes have had different ideological agendas, and as the period of the statistical reproduction is positioned in Mubarak presidency, it is reasonable to limit the analysis to this period.

4.2.1 Disputed Identity and the Search for Equality: 1919-1981

The Coptic Christianity used to be the majority religion of Egypt, but after becoming a minority in Egypt sometime during the Middle Ages they entered into *dhimmitude* (protected minority). This gave them a protected status, as secondary citizens, and with the patriarch as political leader (Martin 2005b; Esposito 2003: *dhimmi*). The Patriarch enjoyed nearly full political autonomy over the minority, as long as taxes (*jizyah*) were paid and the minority did not interfere in Muslim rule (McCallum 2007:928).

Around the middle of the 19th century under the rule of Muhammad Ali the Egyptian society was in need of skilled tax collectors and scribes, and the *dhimmi* status was abolished. Copts were brought into the public sphere, and became free to participate in all aspects of public life (Van Doorn-Harder 2005:25-26; Afif 1999:275). When the British took control over Egypt

¹⁰ Throughout this analysis I use the term *diaspora* when writing about the émigré communities, and *native Egyptian* when I have to distinguish the Copts resident in Egypt. In the literature there is no consistent terminology in this field, and I find this the most precise for this analysis.

during the late 19th century the national consciousness of Egyptians grew, and tensions arose between the Western colonial powers and native Egyptians. Even though the British regime attempted not to give the Coptic society benefits, mistrust between the Muslim and Coptic communities emerged resulting in growing inter-communal clashes (*ta-ifiyya*) (Smith 2005:66-70; Gorman 2003:156). But parallel to the growing inter-communal tensions a secular nationalism emerged. Encompassing both Coptic and Muslim Egyptians alike, it became central in the 1919 revolution. One of the central propagators of this nationalism was the mainly Coptic Wafd party. In the process of decolonization Egyptians rallied under this identity narrative (Van Doorn-Harder 2005:27). The Wafd party afterwards felt so confident of the integrated position of the Copts, that when the constitution was written they denounced any clause giving them minority-rights, while Islam was made the state religion (Van Doorn-Harder 2005:26).

The interwar years represented difficult years for Egyptians, and as a response the population turned towards their religious identities (Philip 1995:131). One product of this was the Muslim Brotherhood, whose ideas received a growing level of support towards the 1950s, along with inter-communal clashes reemerging in strength. In this new form of Arabic-Muslim nationalism Copts were framed as non-Egyptian, and their allegiance was questioned (Gorman 2003:162-3). As a consequence Copts entered into what has been labeled a *neo-millet* system; a pseudo-minority status, not dhimmitude nor fully integrated, a position that has lasted until today (Gorman 2003:166).

After the coup in 1952 colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser, in an attempt to calm the situation, imprisoned more radical Islamist elements. He gave Copts certain rights, and maintained a good relation to the Church, but his politics also hit the Coptic community disproportionately hard (Gorman 2003:157,168). Abolition of political parties gave Copts less influence in political questions, and the neo-millet system became the only viable way of organizing (Farah 1986:49-50). Politics of nationalization of land affected Copts hard, many being land owners and several chose to emigrate (Smith 2005:74). Further the nationalism of Nasser was formed around *pan-Arabism*. This resulted in a general Arabization of society and Islam becoming a legitimizing discourse (Gorman 2003:167-8).

Even though Coptic historians have an ambiguous take on the Nasser years, the following presidency of Anwar al-Sadat represents a more difficult period for Christians. The Ibn Khaldoun Center has recorded 8 incidents of inter-religious violence in the 1950s and 1960s

contrasting 49 incidents during the 1970s (Van Doorn-Harder 2005:55[24]). There are several reasons for this. During the presidency of Sadat extreme Islamists imprisoned under Nasser was released, and together with them the conflicts Nasser had attempted to isolate. Through involvement in the public discourse these organizations aroused fear of the Coptic minority (Van Doorn-Harder 2005:27). In general Sadat followed a more Islamist line than both Nasser and later Mubarak, not taking action to hinder violence against the Coptic minority. Towards the end of his reign and as inter-communal violence grew stronger Sadat sent Patriarch Shenouda III in house arrest to a Monastery, accusing him of inciting violence and scheming to create a separate Coptic state (Van Doorn-Harder 2005:27).

The distinction between an *Egyptian* nationalism and a *pan-Arabian Muslim* identity is at the core of the conflict dynamics all the way throughout the period. Whereas on one hand different groups and different regimes have supported one of the two to an increasing extent, the Copts have continued to insist on an *Egyptian* national identity where they *must* be considered an integrated part of Egyptian society. In analyzing the Copts as a minority I am going against the identity of the minority itself. Yet, I find it both justifiable and helpful to understand the situation.

4.2.2 Repression, Discrimination and Conditions for Copts:1981-2005

The position of the Coptic Christians in Egypt is disputed which makes it difficult to depict one clear history of the conflict dynamics. I chose to focus on factors that can and have affected the sense of *relative deprivation* among Copts. MAR records several incidents of repression, which are one of the strongest indicators of *relative deprivation*. The concerns raised by researchers and NGO's can in general be categorized into three different categories: (1) Legal aspects and political representation, (2) non-governmental religious violence and repression, and (3) lack of government policies and reaction to such violence. But first of all I will draw the lines from the historical résumé into the political landscape of Egypt in the 1980s and 90s.

After Sadat had been assassinated by Islamist extremists, Mubarak's primary concern was the possibility of a revolution similar to the Iranian two years prior (McDermott 1988:68). Coming into power, he ordered the arrest of some 2000 individuals and declared Egypt in a state of emergency. Valid throughout the period of analysis this gives the president both judiciary and executive power. (Brown 2000:1076). Naturally Mubarak was not as supportive

of Islamist extremists as Sadat had been, but was neither protecting the Coptic minority (Van Doorn-Harder 2005:28). Throughout the period from 1980 throughout the 1990s the central focus of the states politics was based in achieving national security and political stability. For this reason the government locked up dissidents and suppressed public debates (Van Doorn-Harder 2005:29). At the same time, and probably for the same reason, *moderate* Islamist elements were given room, and several Islamist leaders were released from prison (McDermott 1988:198). During these early years the state censorship also allowed Islamists to discredit and question Copts. As in the late 1940s and the 1970s Copts were framed in hateful tones, as crusaders and collaborators of Jewish and Western interests (Gorman 2003:162; Van Doorn-Harder 2005:30). Even though the Brotherhood was banned, these ideas are distinctly Ikhwanist¹¹. There were more moderate voices present, but in general the 1980s and the early 1990s represent a period with a heightened aggression directed towards Copts (Rowe 2009:116). This is especially visible in the escalating number of recorded clashes. During the 1980s there were 111 recorded incidents and between 1990 and 1993 there were 368 recorded incidents (Van Doorn-Harder 2005:55[24]).

In 1984 the electoral system was reintroduced, and a few non-radical parties were allowed to be formed. Following this decision in 1985 Patriarch Shenouda III was released from his house arrest (Rowe 2009:116). This shows a less aggressive attitude from Mubarak's side than that of Sadat, but still there were no incentive for the Egyptian state to stop the growing number of attacks on Christians until 1993. As the attacks became more common, and Ikhwanist ideas received higher acceptance within Egypt, increasing Islamist attacks on government security forces and tourists, "the lifeblood of Egyptian economy", became the turning point for situation (Rowe 2009:116; Van Doorn-Harder 2005:32). It became evident that a good relation to the Coptic minority represented a security factor (Van Doorn-Harder 2005:28). The government did two things. First of all, they started to target Islamists (Rowe 2009:116). Several extremists were arrested, Friday prayers were surveilled, and the national discourse regarding Egyptian identity addressed. Through a revision of the state school curriculum, literature on the Copts was included, and mass media was encouraged to have more coverage of Coptic issues (Van Doorn-Harder 2005:32). Secondly, the state went into dialogue with the Coptic leadership. The crucial factor relating to this is that the Copts through the 1980s and early 90s had moved in a direction where they were prepared to constructively collaborate with the state. Opposite to the tendency in the Muslim majority,

¹¹ *Ikhwan* is Arabic for *Brotherhood*, and is used regarding their ideas.

Copts still regarded their identity as Egyptian, not Christian Western. Through social studies they had developed a categorization of whom, within the Egyptian society, their enemies were (Van Doorn-Harder 2005:33). This resulted in the Coptic minority not regarding all Muslim Egyptians as enemies, but as brothers and sisters. In short the Coptic *Egyptian* Nationalism seems to have made them not develop a general sense of relative deprivation towards *all* of Egypt.

This process kept on through the 1990s, and much of the literature in general frames this as a period of relative calmness (Van Doorn-Harder 2005; Garman 2003). The MAR-data on the other hand, and amongst others Rowe (2009) reports murders of Coptic Christians to continue throughout the 1990s. Fox' (2008:237) *A World Survey of Religion and the State* also categorizes Egypt as a land with a high level of restrictions on minorities in the period. However, much of this has to do with a heightened restriction of extreme Islamists. Nevertheless, he also report that the government did not adequately investigate violence directed towards Copts. Thus, the government seems continue to be more interested in national security.

In the MAR dataset there are generally two forms of non-governmental violence directed towards Coptic Christians. There were incidents where Copts, Coptic property or police protecting the property were targeted directly by extreme Islamists, and there were a number of incidents where mobs of Egyptian Muslims had attacked Copts and burned churches. The data and the literature suggest it usually was a mob that, after rumors had spread regarding some Copts in the local community, decided to attack. The police was most often recorded to respond slowly and the perpetrators receive light punishment (Fox 2008:237, Minorities at Risk Project 2009:*Copts*).

Even though the state is considered Muslim, within the legal system the Copts are not registered as a minority, and Copts are considered to be fully integrated into the Egyptian society (Van Doorn-Harder 2005:33). Still there are a number of legal matters that single out Copts. First of all the Coptic Church is required to get a presidential approval to build churches or repair a church building, a result of a law stemming from the Ottoman Empire. However, in 1998 the government took actions to make this easier, which has increased the number of Coptic churches being built and repaired (Brown 2000:1087f; Fox 2000b:140).

Prior to the 1930s Copts were leading producers of newspapers and journals, but towards the 1950s they lost this position. Today distribution of Coptic films and media is restricted and does not go outside the church. Further mass media during the early parts of the period of analysis only 5 hours of media coverage related to the Coptic minority whereas 3000 hours was dedicated to Islamic teaching. During the period of analysis changes were made (Van Doorn-Harder 2005:32,34-35).

Regarding representation in official offices Copts are represented to a reasonable extent in lower parts of state administration, but have no representation in higher offices. In all, the conditions of Copts are not very critical, but as a minority they are discriminated in legal and representational matters. Yet, during the 1990s the level of representation increased (Van Doorn-Harder 2005:50; Fox 2000b:141).

4.2.3 Coptic Movements, Reactions and Responses: 1919-2005

After the 1919 revolution the secular idea of “the one nation united in the cross and the crescent” lost influence. Facing growing alienation towards the 1950s Copts rallied around their church and strengthened its institution by revitalizing traditions, functions and narratives. This has been framed as a revival of three aspects: pedagogical, pastoral and monastic (Van Doorn-Harder 2005:38).

Prior to the independence priests and monks were most often uneducated, but following the heightened focus on religious identities, a larger number of the educated Copts was recruited into monasteries and church service. This new generation of clergy became engaged in social activities and the Sunday School Movement, strengthening bond between parish and clergy through combining the spiritual and social practices (Van Doorn-Harder 2005:38f). Throughout the period of analysis, the church has continued the process of clericalization. The number of educated monks has increased and allowed Shenouda to ordain more bishops to supervise the priests.

As a reaction to a low level of Christian curriculum in the schools, 1918 saw the dawning of the lay initiative of the Sunday School Movement. From its creation it has grown into an important part of growing up within the Coptic minority, raising consciousness on doctrinal questions, church loyalty and creating new generations of active church members (Van Doorn-Harder 2005:40f).

The *monastic* revival has emphasized the monk as the core of the Coptic Church. Through the statement “(...) every Copt [is] a monk.” the monastic ideal is internalized and made part of what it means to be a Copt (Van Doorn-Harder 2005 44-45). Through this revival the church has become the unifying factor within the minority. The leadership has become competent and strong, and Copts in general are both loyal to and partaking in Church life and organization. Still, why the leadership has chosen a *pacific* response is not answered by this. Looking at movements with grievances I will attempt to answer this.

During the 1950s the literature reports of one incident of a Coptic separatist militia. As a reaction to the burning of a Coptic Church in Suez followed by the murder of several Copts, the organization *Jama'at al-Umma al-Quibtiyya* (JUQ) was founded by a Coptic lawyer in 1952. A separatist movement formed with the rather diffuse aim of initiating a revival of Coptic culture, it formed a militia and offered arms and training. Its founder claimed it had 92,000 members but the number is probably highly exaggerated. After it was made illegal in 1954 it went underground. Its most spectacular act was the kidnapping of Patriarch Anba Yusab II in 1954, which had little effect (Gorman 2003:169-71). As mentioned above this was a minor organization with little effect on Coptic attitudes in the decades that followed. Still, being an example of a Coptic separatist movement it serves to show, first, that such narratives did exist, secondly how little influence such narratives had in the years that followed, and lastly that the Coptic community had the means to establish such an organization.

After the failure of the Wafd project, and being increasingly alienated, the Coptic community went through reorganization. Through the revival and its position in the neo-millet system the Church organization became increasingly strengthened (Rowe 2009:113; Smith 2005:76). At the beginning of the 1970s Shenouda III was appointed Patriarch. He showed a political strength and willingness his predecessor had not. In a situation where concerns were raised by the Western diaspora, extreme Islamism was growing, and incidents of churches being burned, Shenouda arranged conferences and demonstrations that voiced the concerns of Coptic Christians (Rowe 2009:114). Sadat, having become dependent on the support of Islamists throughout his presidency tackled the situation by openly accusing the Coptic Church leadership of separatism, working for a Coptic state around Assuit (Farah 1986:2-5; Van Doorn-Harder 2005:27; Smith 2005:63). Regarded as a rebellious religious leader Shenouda was put under house arrest, and only released in 1985. After this Shenouda III, and the Coptic community chose a quietist approach regarding sectarian questions. Among native

Egyptian Copts it has become close to a taboo to focus on aspects of conflict. Literature that focuses on Coptic-Muslim conflicts does not receive the approval of the Patriarch, which effectively means it will not be read by Egyptian Copts (Van Doorn-Harder 2005:33). This has throughout Mubarak's presidency resulted in a growing tension between the Egyptian native Copts, and the Western diaspora (Smith 2005:62). Whereas native Copts have chosen to oversee incidents or factors that could lead to a sense of relative deprivation, the Western diaspora has chosen to *focus* on these aspects. The Western diaspora has through lobbying and media stunts to an increasingly extent been able to frame Copts as a minority under grave discrimination and repression (Rowe 2001:86). On the other hand, by clinging to the argument that "Egypt makes Copts into what they are" the Native Church has effectively defined the Muslim Egyptians as brothers and sisters. Even though it could be criticized for being naïve, this position created a room that made it possible to identify the enemy more precisely, and paved the way for a reconciliatory process as soon as the government saw it prudent. When this happened after 1993 the Coptic Church went into an alliance with the Mubarak government which has led to improving conditions for the Coptic minority. The diaspora on the other hand, focusing on the areas and incidents of conflict, has found itself on collision course with both the Egyptian government and the Coptic Church (Smith 2005:77).

The diaspora, and especially the one in the US, has become more in tune with Western thinking and politics, and throughout the 1990s allied themselves with lobbies on the Christian Right (Rowe 2001:88f). As the native Copts have a close identity to the Egyptian, which becomes clear in their support for the Palestinians and in protesting the US Iraqi invasion in 2003, (Van Doorn-Harder 2005:48) the diasporas alliance with the Christian Right in the US has strengthened the assumption that the US Copts are playing a part for an American and Zionist imperial conspiracy (Rowe 2001:89). The US Coptic lobby has during the 1990s focused their effort on monitoring oppression of Copts in Egypt. As an example, when in 2000 there were incidents of inter-communal clashes in el-Kosheh, the Coptic lobby produced reports, articles, and mobilized the continuing campaign on their web-pages in "solidarity with the persecuted Copts" (Rowe 2001:90). Whereas the Egyptian Coptic community and the Church has communicated satisfaction and loyalty towards the Egyptian government, this becomes an indication of how the sense of relative deprivation is felt more by Copts in diaspora than the in Egypt (Smith 2005:63).

4.2.4 Religion as Identity

Among native Egyptian Copts *descent* is emphasized as a central aspect of what it means to be a Copt. They still consider themselves to be descendants of the Pharaonic culture. (Smith 2005:64). The national identity and loyalty, is further continuously underlined in the Coptic identity narrative. Smith (2005:79) argues that the Egyptian and Coptic identities exist in “different spheres”, and thus emphasize their separate functions. Still I argue that the way the Church has taken sides with the Egyptian government in international affairs, and give these religious implications, is an argument for how the identities are linked. An example of this is how the Church has banned all pilgrimages to Israel based in the political conflict between the two countries. Contrary to the “worldwide Christian allegiance to holly places in Israel”, Copts will be excommunicated if they go there on pilgrimage (Van Doorn-Harder 2005:33). Further Shenouda has written that Copts that attack Egypt or Mubarak can no longer be considered Copts (Smith 2005:61). Smith is however right claiming that being Coptic is different from being Egyptian in the sense that all Egyptians are not Copts. Still Egypt is held as what defines Copts. Naturally there are more to the Coptic identity than this religiously argued nationalism, but in analyzing the relations between the native Egyptian Copts, the diaspora and the Egyptian Muslims it becomes central. Whereas the Muslim majority has moved towards a nationalism that excludes or marginalizes Copts, the native Copts have continued to emphasize an Egyptian nationalism that encompasses the cross and the crescent equally, insisting their place in Egypt (Rowe 2005:102).

The Coptic minority has religious *power structures* as a central part of their organization. The strengthening of the position of the Patriarch from 1919-1970, and the way in which the patriarch has been the undisputed minority hegemon throughout the period of analysis shows a strong religious organization. In addition this church seems to be a guarantor of the wholeness of reality. An example of this is how Copts that for practical reasons have become Protestants still continue to practice the Coptic rite (Smith 2005:65). The patriarch also has strong control over native Copts, both when it comes to formation of opinions and actions.

The Coptic Orthodox Church is proud of its role in the first ecumenical meetings in the first centuries, and has in recent years been active in World Council of Churches and Middle East Council of Churches. However this choice seems to be a more political than having any relevance for Coptic identity. As an example of this, the Church and its members has chosen to support the international politics of the Egyptian government, rather than that of Christian

nations elsewhere. Copts also generally dislike being labeled Christians on identity cards as it coupled them with Western Christians (Smith 2005:64). In short they partake in ecumenical processes, but do not let it affect their identity.

The diaspora has throughout the period of analysis developed a different identity. The Egyptianness is made abstract and internalized (Van Doorn-Harder 2005:33). Being Egyptian is not something that makes them have relate to the Muslim population, it is something abstract, which gives them the *right* to criticize. In this sense the *descent* is still important, but made more abstract.

The authority of the Patriarch is global, still the *opinion* of the Western diaspora seems to not be affected by the Egyptian church. As it chose political quietism, the diaspora went into alliance with the US Christian Right. First of all, this shows how the Western diaspora has become integrated into Western societies. By making such an alliance they are no longer an isolated Coptic cell outside Egypt, but partaking in the public discourse. Further it shows that the diaspora stands closer to the way the Western Christian lobby speaks about Christian minorities in the Muslim world, than that of the Coptic minority itself.

Lastly the disagreement between the mother church and the diaspora has led to a contest over the power to define the reality of Copts in Egypt. The central web pages on the Coptic situation is either under Church control, emphasizing that Copts are neither a minority nor repressed, or channels for the Western diaspora, claiming that Copts are under severe repression (Smith 2005:61).

4.2.5 Religion as Opportunity

The native Egyptian Copts *opportunity* to rebel is rather obvious. Apart from not having a high geographical concentration, the organization is strong and has a history of both militias and organizing protests. The Church also has wide political power and potential support from the diaspora if they wished at some point to engage in violent protest.

The diaspora seem not to have the opportunity to rebel. Most probably they use the political influence they can wield already, and with little effect on the ground.

4.2.6 Religion as Motive

Leaning on the historical résumé there are several issues that the diaspora could have, and have developed a sense of relative deprivation over. Where Copts once were perceived as equal members of society, the neo-millet system represents a deprivation of equality. Nasser's politics, depriving Copts of land and influence disproportionately, are also a factor in this sense. The marginalization under Sadat's presidency and the isolation from the national identity is also relevant. These factors did indeed become actualized by the native and diaspora Coptic protests during the 1970s, as well as by JUQ after 1952.

During the period of analysis the situation seemed to stabilize, and apart from the clashes and general animosity from the Muslim majority, there were no changes made that can be said to further deprive the Coptic minority of rights. Still the legal, representational and inter-communal issues remained present. However, where the Church in the 1970s chose to protest against these issues, from 1981-93 they chose to apply a political quietism. This might have been a result of Shenouda fearing the consequences, acceptance of the fact that the government had its agenda regardless, or based on recognition of the fact that being the political spokes person of the Copts represented benefits. Regardless this led to the development of a pacific attitude, where issues of conflict were dealt with behind closed doors, and where the positive aspects of Coptic life were emphasized. Regardless of the reasons the argument for this was based in the emphasis of the common identity of all Egyptians. From 1993-2005 the Church continued to emphasize this narrative framing Egypt and Copts as inseparable, but now also with the support of the government. During this period the legal aspects and the representational, as well as discrimination in mass media-representation, was accommodated by the government. Even endowments confiscated under Nasser were returned. The only factor that continued in strength was the inter-communal violence.

Whereas Shenouda claims these are not systematical, and that the government is not to be held responsible, the diaspora has used these incidents and neglect from the government, to create a picture where Egyptian Copts are repressed. As the native Copts went into quietism, the diaspora went into alliance with Western Christian lobbies. This alliance seems to have affected their rhetoric, agenda and perspective. But, to not being able to view the Coptic minority in the landscape of minorities in Egypt, this has given a one sided focus where every issue is seen in a pattern of repression of Christian minorities in the Middle East. In short, the

distance from the issues and their integration into the US society gives them the opportunity to continue to nurture a motive for protest.

4.2.7 Summary Discussion: Coptic First, Then Egyptian, Christian Last

The Egyptian Copts traditionally emphasizes a common Egyptian *descent*. This has been a stronger identity than the Christian *Network* identity. The emphasis of descent can be understood as more important as a guaranty for the wholeness of reality, than the identity stressing the difference between the Muslims and Coptic Christians. There are two movements going in each direction from this point on. First of all, as a response to repression the Copts have chosen to isolate and strengthen their own tradition and communal identity. Through this the church-organization, and communication of *power*, has grown stronger, and the Patriarch has become the only contestant for the role as minority hegemon. Further the focus on education and knowledge has become stronger. The Patriarch has been operational in this development. Studies of *who* the repressors are, have led to a more targeted response to repression, emphasizing the few rather than the many. This has led the Copts to be able to continue emphasizing the common descent.

Opposing this trend is the identity developing amongst Copts living abroad. Throughout the last decades the Coptic Church has had to deal with a growing diaspora. Especially in the US has the emphasis of the common identity with Muslim Egyptians decreased in importance. Emphasis of the Copts as a repressed minority, non-Egyptian resident Copts have been able to find support through the Christian *network*. If this identity had developed among Egyptian Copts as well, this could have represented a strengthened *opportunity* to rebel. This emphasis of descent and knowledge has led to Copts developing a low level of felt deprivation. The lack of this identity has among the diaspora led to a perceived deprivation. I therefore conclude that the identity of common descent has led to a lack of *motive* to rebel.

An interesting factor I wish to underline at this point is that the Copts are not separatist. However they *are* nationalists. Even though this is not *religious nationalism* as described by Juergensmeyer (1993) this suggests that Fox' assumption and my hypothesis, that the pattern has to do with religious nationalism, is wrong. It is tempting to claim that this is a form of religious nationalism that has produced a pacific response. The claim that something has politicized religion is also weakened, as the Church is highly politically active and using religious narratives in their politics. Rather it suggests, contrary to Nordås (2010) conclusion

of *identity* being secondary to *motive*, that identity can inform motive. As it has done in Southern Sudan, motive and identity goes hand in hand. The only difference is that in Sudan identity was changed to accommodate the need for motive, whereas in Egypt motive was hindered by identity. Finally, two observations are important to address. Religious leaders of the minority, through both cases, are generally associated with dialogical peace initiatives. On the other hand, lay leaders seem to be associated with conflict. Further, Western identities that focus on network rather than descent is associated with conflict. Egyptians that place their identity in today's Egypt is associated with lack of grievances. The diaspora having their identity in a Western context, is associated with stronger motives for rebellion. This is a parallel to the Sudanese case where a growing Christian network identity, and Western alliance, has developed as an answer to repression. This point in a direction supporting an *identity* based explanation of why religion triggers conflict. Motive is not irrelevant, and most importantly, identity not constant, but an identity that supports the notion of *difference* between the majority and minority allows hard factors, such as repression, to develop relative deprivation, and subsequently become a reason for conflict. This might be the telltale to what lies behind the factor *separatism*. Still, the conformation of whether these ideas reach beyond a two case comparison will depend on the third case.

4.3 The Maronites in Lebanon: Issues and Actors

Since the independence in 1943 Lebanon has experienced more or less unstable situations, partly because of inter-communal conflicts, and partly spillover from neighboring countries. Most severe was the Lebanese Civil War in 1975—1990 where inter-communal tensions played a central role. Since the 1990s there has been relative stability.

Lebanon is in many ways a rather special case. It is constituted around a division of power between four religiously defined minorities. Originally created by the French as a protective harbor for the Christian Maronites, these used to constitute over 50% of the population. Hence when the constitution was adopted in 1943 Maronites were given six parliamentary seats for every five seats given to the other minorities. With time the respective sizes of the different minorities have changed drastically. There has *not* been an official census since 1937, but there have been several attempts at estimates. Based on these one assumes that Maronites today constitute around 21%, whereas the Sunnis are the largest population group. After the Civil War, and because of the changes in composition of the population, the Ta'if peace

accord altered the power balance. Due to historical developments this change goes against what has become defined as *Lebanese nationalism*. Under Ottoman rule Lebanon and Syria were one region, and Lebanese nationalism was a construct of the post-WWI French mandate, defining Lebanese culture by Maronitic presence. In contrast, a different school focused on the *Arabian* identity in Syria as a whole. This dichotomy resulted in the choice of dividing the area in 1919. The Maronite supremacy has since defined Lebanese nationalism, in contrast to pan-Arabianism or Syrianism.

This case was selected because the religiously distinct Maronite minority experienced repression during the period, and has active separatism. Separatism has not been very visible post-Ta'if, but such discourses are present latent within the minority's historical identity narrative. The question of why the Lebanese Christian Maronites did not develop rebel-movements in the period of analysis is still not obvious. The level of repression *was* minor, with only two incidents registered in the MAR-data. Nevertheless, there *are* clear indications of *relative deprivation*, and Maronites have a recent history of religious militias, and inter-communal warfare based on such grievances. The potential for relative deprivation being present in both periods, the contrast between the minority during the Civil War and the years that followed creates a potential for a comparative perspective. I therefore define the period of analysis from the end of the Civil War in 1990 and end it in 2005 in accordance with the other two analyses. The civil war years from 1975-1990 will serve as the comparative perspective, similar to the Coptic diaspora. With this in mind, the chapter of the civil war will be given more room. I will also include an introduction to the Lebanese nationalist narratives as this identity plays a central role. Because the Church became an important political figure in the post-war years, distinguishing religious developments from the historical developments in the period of analysis is difficult. This chapter will therefore partially overlap with the following chapter on religious dynamics. The latter will in turn focus more exclusively on religious movements and dynamics from 1975-2005. Towards the end I will discuss religion as *identity*, *opportunity*, and *motive* for Maronitic rebellion.

4.3.1 Maronite Supremacy and the Civil War: 1975-1990

The modern history of Lebanon can be said to begin with the French mandate, and the division between Syria and Lebanon after WWI. At this point the Lebanese and Syrian nationalisms had led the earlier undivided area under Ottoman rule, to be separated into two

states. The Lebanese nationalism was thus formulated in contrast to Syrianism. Firro (2004:1) finds conceptualizations of *Syria* as a cultural unit distinct from other Arab cultures, from the 1830s. By the 1920s the idea of Greater Syria, based on distinctions between Syria and other Arabian cultures, had grown into Arabism or Syrianism in contrast to Lebanese nationalism, which focused more exclusively on Maronitic particularism (Firro 2004:2).

The content of this anti-Arabic nationalism was formed around historical, cultural and ethnical arguments. Firstly, the Maronites were historically refugees who found a safe haven in the Lebanese mountains during the fifth century, creating a Christian enclave in the Muslim Middle East (Haddad 2002:318). After this several waves of refugees from Muslim rulers partake in the identity narrative of Maronite nationalism (Haddad 2002b:30; Firro 2004:13-14). Finally, Lebanese nationalist narrative underlines European invaders as allies and liberators (Firro 2004:3-4; Hagopian 1989:109). The perception of the Crusaders as liberators, which remained after the occupation ended in 1270 is considered to have become a part of the Maronite culture, followed by the unification with the Roman Catholic Church (Firro 2004:12; Haddad 2002a:318). Throughout shifting regimes, Mount Lebanon's Landscape resulted in relative autonomy and an "ethnographic purity", giving room to develop a distance to proximal cultures (Tabet 1920:88 in Firro 2004:11). This has produced a narrative that frames Maronites as a nation present in the region to protect it against Arab Muslims. This has been used to argue Maronite particularism and chauvinism, known as Maronitism (Firro 2004:23-24; Haddad 2002b:32). One effect of this towards the Civil War was a people feeling "under siege in their own land" (Rowe 2005:97).

The process of independence during the French mandate resulted in a separate state in 1943, created in protection of the Christian minority (Rowe 2005:95; Haddad 2002b:31). It was formed as a sectarian democratic system, where each of the four religious minorities was represented according to their size in the 1937 census. This was done to secure the Christians, but ensure an efficient political system Christian parties were dependent on support from other parties. This led to originally sectarian parties forming a *secular* platform; a paradox as sectarian *identities* remained strong (Rowe 2005:96). Through the 1960s and 70s the question of the Palestinian refugees and PLO setting up headquarters in Lebanon actualized the question of sectarian identities and Maronite hegemony (Hegelian 1989:101). Whereas Lebanese Muslims fostered solidarity towards the refugees, Maronites had developed an alliance with Israeli Zionists as early as the 1930s (Haddad 2002b:32). This produced a

sectarian polarization, where Maronites became more chauvinistic and Lebanese Muslims turned towards pan-Arabism. Within this environment the political system became inefficient, and became replaced by a system of smaller parties and militias formed by networks of kinship and around local leaders (*zuama*). Among these was the Phalange movement, a Lebanese nationalist movement formed in the 1930s around the Gemayel family. These groups articulated “(...) aggressive nationalistic claims backed up by local and regional militias (...)” resulting in a “(...) competitive nationalistic system of religious communalism” and a growing sense of deprivation (Rowe 2005:97). The Muslim response to Maronite chauvinism was to support pan-Arabism (Rowe 2005:98). When Maronite leaders formed the Lebanese Front in 1975, its goal was to ensure Chauvinistic Maronite hegemony in Lebanon parallel to the Zionist project of Israel (Haddad 2002b:33; Baroudi and Tabar 2009:197; Hagopian 1989:101). Through the early 1970s the militarized nationalistic movements became increasingly aggressive, seeing their Christian identity in ascriptive terms (Rowe 2005:98).

In addition the Lebanese National Front (LNF) was formed, uniting the other minorities in the goal of creating a secular Lebanese state. As PLO was becoming a strong factor in Lebanon and chose to support LNF, Maronite nationalist politicians feared their supremacy was threatened. In this environment they turned to Israel for support, further intensifying the conflict (Hagopian 1986:106). Part of the growing conflict can thus be seen as a spillover effect of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but the overall motive of the war from the Maronite actors was to ensure Christian Maronitic culture as the core of the Lebanese state.

Towards the end of the 1970s the Maronite militias were unified in the Lebanese Forces (LF). This movement was a hard line militant movement driven by many of the same goals as the Lebanese Front, which it engulfed in the early 1980s. Supported by Israel LF had several successful campaigns in Southern Lebanon, and secured Bashir Gemayel the Presidency in August 1982 (Rowe 2005:99, Hagopian 1986:107). His presidency was brief, and after his assassination on September 14th his brother Amin became president. Not possessing the political talent of his brother, the movement soon faced several problems. Amin did not have the same capability to cooperate with the Muslim leaders, nor did he manage to control the LF. The accord he accepted with Israel in 1983 further heightened the temperature. This hardened the inter-sectarian relations in Lebanon and became a turning point in the conflict. Druze forces drove LF back, and Muslim units within the military mutinied. The 1985

tripartite agreement, negotiated by Syria between representatives from Druze, Shi'ite and Christian minorities, and signed by LF-leader Hobeika, further added to this tendency. The agreement was an attempt at settling the conflict, but internal disagreement within LF regarding its content resulted in Samir Geagea toppling Hobeika's command over the forces. Responding to this, Syrian forces went into the "Christian heartlands" reducing their control, and Muslim ministers paralyzed the government. By 1986 the Maronite political unity was scattered, their control was minimal, and they had no central figure to gather around (Baroudi and Tabar 2009:199). In this vacuum of power the newly elected Patriarch Sfeir seized a position. Sfeir was of the belief that Maronites no longer could solve the conflict by military means, and aimed for a solution where Lebanon would be ruled by consensus (Baroudi and Tabar 2009:200).

In 1988 Gemayel stepped down as president and handed the position over to General Aoun. Patriarch Sfeir and the new president saw eye to eye on several issues, but on one crucial they diverged. Whereas Sfeir opted for consensus, Aoun was determined to keep the presidency for himself. This resulted in quite different positions towards the Ta'if negotiations that would end the civil war (Haddad 2002b:33). Whereas Aoun did not support the negotiations, Sfeir was positive to the overall attempt. Seeing it as the only realistic path towards peace he signed the final agreement, becoming central in legitimizing the accord. When Ilyas Hrawi was elected president later the same year, Sfeir chose to side with him giving further legitimacy to the process in the years to come (Baroudi and Tabar 2009:201).

Whether the reason for Sfeir to accept the Ta'if accord was of lack of other options or to achieve peace in a Lebanon remains unanswered. The literature is divided with regards to this, but most probably both factors played a part: While the complaints of the Christian population grew in the following years, and the patriarch chose to side with Palestinians and criticized the West, he also favored moderation and made efforts to stop increasing disadvantages for Christians (Haddad 2002b:33-4; Baroudi and Tabar 2009:201; Rowe 2005:100-101).

4.3.2 Coming to terms with Positions in a new Reality: 1990-2005

From 1990 to 1992 the adaptation of the Ta'if represents the decisive blow fragmenting the Maronites. The first year saw an intra-communal civil war over the accord, fought between LF under Geagea and Aoun controlling parts of the army each (Sirriyeh 1998:62). Following this, Syria managed to oust Aoun, the main obstacle towards implementation of Ta'if, and the

same month another Maronite leader, Danny Chamoun, was assassinated. This was blamed on Geagea, who was convicted for life (Sirriyeh 1998:63-4). As a result, by the mid 1990s *all* of the central Maronitic leaders from the civil war were dead, exiled or imprisoned. The leaders who were left were not as extreme, and also weaker (Sirriyeh 1998:65).

One of these leaders was pro-Syrian president Hrawi. His first task was to implement the Ta'if agreement, executed through *the Government of National Unity* headed by Omer Karami (Baroudi and Tabar 2009:202). Central in the accord was a renegotiation of the power-sharing model of 1943. Representation in parliament became a 1:1 ratio rather than 6:5. Further, the army was reorganized and absorbed the militias. The power of the Maronite president was reduced, and the bureaucracy was to include more Muslims. This resulted in Maronite dissatisfaction, but the agreement hindered particularist claims (Sirriyeh 1998:61). The government also chose to sign a treaty of "Brotherhood" with Syria giving Damascus extended influence over Lebanese politics (Sirriyeh 1998:65; Baroudi and Tabar 2009:203). Maronites had given away *much* power to settle the peace only to see it *all* disappear in the Syrian presence (Haddad 2002b:34).

Patriarch Sfeir had originally supported the Ta'if, but seeing how Maronite politicians implemented it he began voicing concerns and frustration of on behalf of the minority, which continued to do throughout the period (Sirriyeh 1998:64; Baroudi and Tabar 2009:204). Towards 1992 he initiated a boycott of the parliamentary elections, as a protest against unfair electoral districts (Baroudi and Tabar 2009:203). But instead of being heard, the election represented a new disaster for the Maronites, as the boycott only resulted in more pro-Syrian Maronite parliamentary representatives (Baroudi and Tabar 2009:204).

In the wake of the war Lebanon found itself in a growing economical crisis. Unemployment rates were reaching 35% and the Lebanese pound was decreasing in value (Najem 1998:31-33). By 1992 the financial crisis had reached such a critical point that Damascus intervened, installing Rafiq Hariri as prime minister to deal with the financial problems (Najem 1998:30, 36). Hariri's government produced the program Horizon 2000, which aimed to double the GDP over a 10-year period (Najem 1998:34). However, the economical problems continued to increase and in 1998 reached a new crisis that few believed Hariri could deal with (Baroudi and Tabar 2009:109). In an attempt to regain momentum Hariri initiated a series of meetings with leaders of the private sector, political blocks, and religious leaders. Meeting with Sfeir in March, Sfeir presented a summary of all criticism the church held against political

developments since the early 1990s. The result was a heated discussion, which ended without any agreement (Baroudi and Tabar 2009:211). Much of the reason Sfeir took this position was that he, as most Christians, felt President Hrawi did not defend his own community. In addition Hrawi's presidency had been extended by Damascus. The end of his presidency was thus a spark of hope. Emile Lahoud, who followed Hrawi, seemed more independent in relation to Syria (Sirriyeh 1998:65). The first four years of his presidency was spent in a conflicted relationship with Hariri, which led Sfeir to support Lahoud (Nizameddin 2006:97). But, towards 2004 his liking of the president diminished.

From the beginning of his presidency Lahoud initiated a process to remove Israel from southern Lebanon. This included support of Hezbollah attacking the South Lebanese Army (SLA), which Israel backed. The SLA had controlled southern Lebanon as an Israeli proxy since 1978. Even though Lahoud refused to send the Lebanese army into the southern territories, Hezbollah managed to significantly weaken the SLA, and by May 2000 its soldiers were fleeing and Israeli forces were withdrawn (Baroudi and Tabar 2009:212). In the absence of Israeli military presence Sfeir and the Council of Maronite Bishops began directing criticism towards the Syrian presence.

In the 2000 Parliament elections Bkirki¹² chose the opposite approach to 1992. By motivating the Christian population, the new parliament consisted of far more representatives sympathetic to Bkirki (Baroudi and Tabar 2009:214). This gave more room for criticism regarding Syrian hegemony, which grew in intensity. Throughout the first part of 2001 anti-Syrian rallies were met by pro-Syrian demonstrations in a heated environment. This was intensified after a trip to US where Sfeir repeated his anti-Syrian arguments. The criticism received support from both the Druze leader Walid Jumblatt and former Prime Minister Karami. Still, Bkirki was also accused of running errands of the West. Emerging from the situation was a Christian minority united for the first time in over 10 years (Baroudi and Tabar 2009:2016-8).

Following the September 11th attack on the World Trade Center, the US began to pursue a harder line in politics in the Middle East. This included putting pressure on Damascus and Syrian politics. Following this Bkirki held back much of his criticism against Syria so as not give support to the US cause. Equally, during the 2003 US Iraqi-invasion, rather than

¹² The seat of the Patriarchate.

supporting the US, Sfeir spoke against the invasion. This received praise from Damascus, pro-Syrian politicians, and Muslim leaders, but still; Sfeir's criticism against the Syrian presence continued as soon as it was politically viable (Baroudi and Tabar 2009:220-1).

In 2004 Damascus extend Lahoud's presidency. In response to this, a united Lebanese opposition was formed, including Patriarch Sfeir, Jumblatt, Hariri and several others. For the first time since 1990 a strong political opposition *within* Lebanon opposed Syrian Hegemony, and was strengthened by the UNSC Resolution 1559 stating all foreign troops should leave Lebanon (Nizameddin 2006:96; Baroudi and Tabar 2009:202). When Hariri was assassinated in February 2005 this opposition became a central force in the 'Cedar Revolution'. After the assassination, popular protest reached such a magnitude that the pro-Syrian government resigned, which eventually led to Syria withdrawing—ending a more or less ongoing military presence since 1975 (Knio 2008:446-8).

4.3.3 Christian Shifts and Reactions: 1975-2005

In the history of Lebanon the Church has had both a religious and political function. This has generally led to a more politically active church than other Eastern churches (Baroudi and Tabar 2009:197, Rowe 2005:86). However, from the independence until Sfeir the Patriarch chose to step back, the Patriarch no longer pursued politics and was only a spiritual leader, except for one incident in 1958. The needs of the people were secured through the state (Baroudi and Tabar 2009:197). Especially between 1975 and 1986 there is a consensus on the Church being passive. Henley (2008) meanwhile, contests the idea that the church was inactive in this period. Differentiating segments of the church that affected the conflict dynamics, he identifies three main religious actors; the Patriarch, the Monastic movement, and the Pope (2008:355-6). The Patriarch had a network that included high representatives, but had chosen to leave the wellbeing of the population in the hands of politicians. In addition the church encompassed different perceptions regarding the conflict, which paralyzed his power. The monastic orders had a much closer relation to the lay, and even though they were under the orders of the Patriarch this contact gave them a larger space to act within. The monastic orders were united under *the Permanent Congress of Lebanese Monastic Orders*, and saw the war in line with Lebanese nationalist narrative as a “struggle for the survival of Lebanon as a final bastion of Christianity in the Muslim-dominated East” (Henley 2008:356).

The monastic support of the Maronite militias was manifested in the roles abbots Naaman and Kassis played in the Phalange party, and in the Lebanese Front (Henley 2008:357).

Whereas the Monastic orders supported the war, the Pope, in contrast to the Patriarch, chose a different line. The Patriarch is, even in a Uniate church, in reality *not* under Vatican rule (Faris 1992:218). As such, Maronites recognize the authority of the Pope but the autonomy of the Church remains. This double loyalty became tenser when the Vatican emphasized Lebanon as a model of cross-communal coexistence, and how the conflict was a spillover from the Israeli-Arab conflict (Henley 2008:359), which created tension between the monastic orders and the Vatican. Through several diplomatic missions to Lebanon, the Vatican voiced a need for dialogue, securing the Maronites' position according to the 1943 national pact, and to protect the Palestinians from new persecutions (Henley 2008:359). The Vatican claimed to do this not to take sides in the conflict, but to place itself "above the politics". The monastic orders however, saw this as treason (Henley 2008:360). Throughout the Civil War the conflict between the Vatican, Kassis and Naaman led to several confrontations (Henley 2008:61).

The Patriarch, weakened between these oppositions continued to preach moderation and reconciliation throughout the conflict, but leading a divided church required far greater political talent and will to put the words into action (Henley 2008:357). This was exactly the sort of figure Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir would become in the following period.

When Sfeir was elected in 1986 the actions taken by the Vatican had resulted in a streamlined hierarchy within the Church (Henley 2008:363). In with the political vacuum, Patriarch Sfeir arrived at the perfect moment. Considering it within his mandate to protect the Christians of Lebanon whilst realizing the Maronites were out of options, he became active in the political sphere, taking sides in the conflict and giving legitimacy to the Ta'if negotiations and accord (Baroudi and Tabar 2009:197-200). It has been suggested that Sfeir was pressured to choose the line of the Vatican, but it has also been argued that he agreed with the position. One can also find evidence of the Patriarch changing the position of the Vatican (Henley 2008:365).

The period 1990-2005 saw a lack of political focus on the concerns and interests of the Maronites, and Sfeir became the main voice of these topics. After the 1992 election he had even fewer political alliances within parliament (Baroudi and Tabar 2009:204). Towards 1994 his public complaints grew, but were largely ignored until the 1994 Easter Sermon. After Geagea was sentenced to life based on what Sfeir saw as indecisive evidence, the Easter

sermon represented a summary of the complaints he focused on the rest of the decade: Maronite representation and the Ta'if implementation, the persecution of Maronite leaders, and harassment of Christians (Baroudi and Tabar 2009:204-5). Still, his goal was never a Christian state led by the Maronites, but equality among the different religious communities. The sermon infuriated the national politicians, and between Easter and June government officials boycotted Bkirki. Meanwhile, Sfeir refused to stop voicing the complaints, and despite little support within the Parliament he managed to politicize the issues. To a growing extent his position became one that the political figures aligned themselves with or against. He thus succeeded in altering the political agenda related to the Maronites (Baroudi and Tabar 2009:206).

After protesting extension of Hrawis presidency the top three leaders negotiated with Sfeir. He attempted to couple issues with the question of Hrawis presidency, but his demands were too big, and without any agreement Damascus decided to overrule any hesitation (Baroudi and Tabar 2009:206-7). In the years that followed Sfeir would be more careful in trying to change issues he could not, but continued to protest and voice the concerns of his people when the political leaders did not.

In the winter of 1995 the Maronitic church held its synod in Rome. In its final message it emphasized the need for inter-religious and inter-communal dialogue and openness, especially between Muslims and Christians. It called for a withdrawal of Syrian and Israeli troops, and stressed the culturally pluralistic and democratic Lebanon (Baroudi and Tabar 2009:207). This led to strong reactions from Muslim leaders who, though they supported the need for dialogue, also resented the notion of cultural pluralism, as it was a rejection of Lebanese Arabism (Baroudi and Tabar 2009:208).

Through emphasis on dialogue and cooperation Sfeir clearly positioned himself closer to the idea of Lebanon as a Middle Eastern construct rather than a Western. This assumption is also underpinned by his views on Palestinians and the US Iraqi invasion in 2003, and the way he stopped his criticism of Syria when it would strengthen the US cause. Where the militant nationalists identified with the West and Israel, Sfeir *criticizes* the US invasion in line with the Lebanese Muslim-communities (Hagopian 1989:103; Rowe 2005:101; Baroudi and Tabar 2009:221).

4.3.4 Religion as Identity

The Maronites are both ethnically and religiously distinct from their surrounding neighbors, all of which play into the religious identity. Being a Maronite is closely related to the history of the area, the national myth, and all has played into the narrative framing Maronites as having a *mission* to protect Christians from the surrounding Muslims in the area. During the Civil War and as the political leaders began to perceive their religious identity in more prescriptive terms, it was exactly this form of religious identity narrative that was emphasized.

Unlike the Egyptian Copts, Maronites communication of common descent informs them of their inherent difference from the Muslims. The wholeness of reality and Lebanon was guaranteed by Maronite supremacy, and claimed to be the sole reason for the war (Sirriyeh 1998:59). One can therefore say that the lay Maronite politicians saw the religious identity as a justification for their pursuit for *power*. On the other hand, a link between power and the ecclesiastic structure lacked. One can therefore equally claim that religion was *not* the justification of power. This either suggests that religion was used to argue a particularism, and through this the gain of power, or that religion as *communication of descent* informed that regional *power* should remain amongst those that shared that particular common descent. The fact that the politicians saw their religious identity in prescriptive terms suggests the latter is the most correct, but the first aspect is probably not untrue either.

Even though the Maronite identity emphasizes their difference, they see themselves as having close bonds to the West. This is true both with regards to political support, and with regards to whom they feel most loyalty towards. During the civil war Maronites expected support from the West and perceived themselves as a Western cell in a Muslim land on several occasions. The national myth and the fact that the Maronitic church is a Uniate Catholic church further support this. Also the fact that Maronites throughout the war sought Western and Israeli alliances rather than Arab underpins this. Whether this *network* is of a religious form or not is questionable, but the religious identity arguably plays a central role given the common Christian bond and how this communicates into the national myth.

After the civil war the Nationalist political leaders were dead, exiled or politically isolated. Religion, as it has been applied in the post-war years, is associated with a rather different identity-narrative. Instead of letting religion become a narrative that informs ethnic and

religious supremacy, religious institutions have emphasized a narrative wherein the local identity and the need for cross-cultural interaction and cooperation have been central. There are several reasons for this shift. Firstly the effective removal of the political leaders from the civil war gave the authority to voice the concerns of the people over to the Patriarch. He did not follow the same hard line of particularism of the civil war, neither during nor after the Ta'if accord. Secondly, the influence of the Vatican began to make its presence, pushing for peace in the region. This shift became visible in several ways.

Following the civil war the emphasis on religion as *communication of common descent* has diminished slightly in importance. As Maronites are still ethnically, geographically and religiously distinct, and the model of government still is based on a sectarian system, descent still has the same relevance as it did during the civil war. Nevertheless it seems to have gained less importance, as the Patriarch has emphasized the need for cooperation rather than supremacy. In many ways religion as *communication of power* has decreased in importance, more so than common descent.

Perhaps more important are changes in the *identity-network*. The Maronites can be said to have, out of necessity, reorganized into a neo-millet system after the war, with the Patriarch as the main voice for the concerns of the people. Rather than aiming for a supreme Maronitic state where a “Western cell of Maronites strive to overcome a Muslim invasion”, the Patriarch emphasizes the *local belongingness* within Lebanon as a multi-cultural state. The Vatican is still above the Patriarch, but instead of viewing their network in prescriptive ways, it seems they have begun to see themselves more as an integrated part of the region, taking sides with the Palestinians, and working towards dialogue and cooperation rather than pursuing a conflict line towards Muslim Lebanese. Choosing to hold back on criticism not to give the US an edge in their criticism of Syria, shows that the Patriarch perceives Maronites more in Middle Eastern terms than as Western allies.

Summing up, the main changes have not happened within the notion of *common descent*. The emphasis of ethno-religious identity as justification for *power* has changed drastically and the perception of the network has changed significantly. This seems related to several factors, of which the political position of the Patriarch is important. Nevertheless this could also, as several scholars have implicated, simply be a product of a change in the minority's opportunity to rebel.

4.3.5 Religion as Opportunity

Opportunity plays a more central part in this case than the two previous. Even though one could argue that the Maronites have the funds, support from groups in exile, geographical concentration, and the organizational structure necessary to develop a military organization in the post-war years, there are external factors that alter the opportunity factor.

During the civil war opportunity is found at several levels. The Cold War offered the opportunity to trigger external support. By framing their cause as proxies of the Israeli–Palestine conflict, as well as the US–Soviet conflict itself, Maronite militias and political leaders had an opportunity to get a military edge in the conflict (Gerges 1997:99-101). The fact that Maronites represented the most influential political factor in Lebanon at the time gave them an upper hand. A consequence of the destabilization of the political parties in the period leading up to the civil war was more power to the *zuama*, which in turn were the main propagators of Maronitism and the most important voice of Maronitic grievances.

Looking at the religious influence on opportunity, the overall influence was scarce. The monastic movements, with their close connection to the lay political leaders, did indeed legitimize the *cause*, thereby probably making it easier to recruit and motivate militia soldiers. The Patriarch, however, neither had the possibility, capability, nor will to interfere. The Vatican represented a voice that went against the perception of the Maronitic political leaders. In that sense, the religiousness of the conflict must be seen as a lay religious interpretation done by politicians.

Since the implementation of the Ta'if agreement, opportunity to rebel has been little: Firstly, all the political leaders the militias were organized around were no longer present in the political landscape. Further, the militias themselves had actively been hindered from reorganizing, partly by being integrated into the army, and partly by being hindered. This has led a significant part of the literature to conclude that opportunity is the *main* reason for why the Maronites have not developed rebellion in the post war years. Another part of the literature points to the role of the Patriarch as central for understanding the lack of rebellion.

The Patriarch and the church have become the minority hegemon. Sfeir has indeed been active in propagating a peaceful approach to inter-communal relations. Still, assuming that this was an effect of the Syrian military presence also means that one has to set as a criterion that Sfeir would use the opportunity to get an upper hand when this offered itself. Thus,

when Sfeir chooses to hold back criticism of Syrian military presence in 2003 in order *not* to support a western cause, such a hypothesis is weakened. His politics has throughout been peace oriented and dialogical, and have *not* sought to build a military capacity or to give Maronites a position to rebel.

From this I conclude that whereas the opportunity was present during the Civil War-years, the relevance of religion was minimal. During the period of analysis opportunity was not present, but sources suggest that the Patriarch, as the minority hegemon, would not have made use of such an opportunity had it offered itself.

4.3.6 Religion as Motive

Through the period of the Civil War *motive* for Maronites was largely related to what they perceived as their right to enjoy a privileged position in Lebanese politics. Viewing their religious identity in ascriptive terms, lay political leaders chose to protect the Christians in the Middle East on behalf of the West. Perceiving their political position as threatened by the PLO and the growing number of the Muslim population as a whole, strengthened the motive. The fact that Maronite politicians had to lean on secular political agendas within a sectarian political system also led to this overall perception of relative deprivation and threat.

Between 1990 and 2005 the sense of deprivation has primarily been voiced by Patriarch Sfeir. His complaints have focused on the way the Ta'if accord has been implemented, but not the accord itself. He has raised issues where Maronites have been treated unfairly, but not questioned the legitimacy of the idea of the power sharing. Perhaps most central in his complaints has been the military presence of Syrian forces within Lebanese territory. Nevertheless, this criticism has been followed by reassurance of the proximity of the two states rather than underpinning the argument by pulling on support from existing conflicts between Israel, or the US and Syria. The Patriarch has worked for improvement of the situation of the Maronites within the Lebanese context throughout, but has not used situations to agitate the population. At the most he has initiated boycotts and protest, but when protesters have been treated unfair, as happened in 2001, he has been careful not to do anything to agitate the population, but rather tried to calm the situation. It would be reasonable to expect a formation of deprivation related to the lost position of the pre-war years, but this has gone against the agenda of the Patriarch and effectively been held back, at best being a marginal opinion.

In summary, it seems that the Patriarch has acted according to an identity that placed Maronites in a Muslim environment. This identity has suggested dialogue and cooperation with the Arab neighbors. This stands in a sharp contrast to the Maronitic identity during the Civil War, which informed Maronites of a mission as a Western cell that was to secure its position as hegemon.

4.3.7 Summary Discussion: A Western Cell in a Land of Enemies

Across the two periods analyzed in the Maronitic case there are two trends that stand out in relation to religion. During the Civil War lay politicians articulated the religious identity. These saw Maronites as representatives of Western Christianity and felt alienated and threatened by growing Muslim influence. At the same time the same politicians expressed trust towards Western powers.

After the Civil war the Patriarch became the minority hegemon. He emphasized an identity of belongingness within the multi-cultural Lebanese society. Remaining a strong voice for Maronitic concerns, he clearly moved away from the *network identity* of the Civil War, where the Christian-Western identity informed Maronite chauvinism. Even though there were many reasons for feeling deprived and developing motives for rebellion, this has not happened under Sfeir's Patriarchy. The identity of common *descent* is however still present, but no longer communicating *power* in the same way. As with the former cases the western identity is associated with rebellion, whereas a local identity is associated with the opposite.

As with the prior cases *religious* leaders, or leaders that are first and foremost spiritual leaders and political leaders second, at most, are associated with dialogue, less conflict and inter-communal cooperation. *Political* leaders that apply a religious rhetoric are, on the other hand, associated with separatism and heightened conflict intensity.

Finally, the pattern where *identity* and *motive* operate in accordance with one another seems to be valid for the Maronites as well. During the Civil War the prevalent Maronitic identity was informing motive. Within that specific narrative military actions seem to have been justified. Within the dominant identity narrative of the post-war years this sense of urgency in terms of protecting a Maronitic chauvinist state is gone. The identity informs Maronites to be Maronites but in a multicultural Lebanon. Grievances as motive only inform protest, and breaking the bond of the Middle Eastern community is out of the question.

In this analysis it is difficult to determine whether identity was altered to accommodate a need for motive, if lack of motive is a product of the identity shift, or if both are altered by a third factor. But, the connection between the two confirms the tendencies in the two previous cases.

5 Conclusions

In concluding the three case-analyses of this thesis I will gather the arguments from the three summary discussions and view them in the light of the initially posed questions. I will do this thematically starting with how religion seems to interact with separatism towards developing rebellion. I will then discuss the findings regarding the different actors and how they apply religion.

The questions posed in the beginning of the thesis were: Why is a religious minority under repression coupled with separatism a stronger predictor of rebellion than without separatism? What happens to religion when merged with separatism? And, what lies behind the indicator *separatism*?

I further stated a set of expectations. Based on the notion that religion need not be political I hypothesize that *separatism* represents a factor that politicizes religion. Based on Fox (2004) I hypothesized that the religion separatism-nexus was parallel to the phenomenon *religious nationalism* as described by among others Juergensmeyer (1993).

5.1 Identity, Opportunity and Motive

Across the three cases religion as opportunity, motive and identity has changed. In Sudan the *identity* changed in the face of increased repression of such intensity that it represented an instant *motive*. In Egypt *identity* can be seen as a mechanism holding back the sense of relative deprivation. In Lebanon, whereas opportunity for rebellion was minimal after 1992, the shift in the *identity* mirrored the shift in *motive*. Throughout the analysis, identity-narrative and motive have followed one another as interlocked phenomena. I find no reasons to assume that this is not a pattern that will be found across similar cases.

When the identity communicates a bond to the repressor, a certain level of repression can occur without triggering grievances. In Egypt the bond to the Egyptian Nation was stronger than the incidents of inter-communal violence and discrimination, and the bond with the West was not preferable. The opportunity was there, if the identity had informed it, but it did not. In Sudan the identity was one of anti-Western attitude, but in the face of forced religious legislation and violent oppression Southerners changed their identity to include English as common language and Christianity as uniting religion. In this case the repression was of such

a character that motive was imminent, and the shift in identity can be seen as a consequence of this—which again offered a narrative that enabled the Southerners to unite in their cause and around the new nation. In Lebanon, even though the Maronites were better off in 1974 than in 1992, the Western identity and chauvinism produced a motive to choose a military solution. After 1992 the renewed and more locally based identity followed a higher acceptance of what the minority was willing to yield to other Lebanese communities.

Differentiating between *hard causes*, such as power-politics and violence, and *soft causes*, such as religion, identity and grievances, it is possible to identify the following mechanism: Soft causes can, if a certain level of hard causes is present, push the motive in the direction of the identity narrative. If identity-narratives securitize an issue, and there is certain reasonability to that claim, a motive can be created. Equally, if the identity-narrative frames a repressive act as marginal, it can hinder development of motive. But, if hard causes become too strong, and a motive becomes imminent, the soft causes will accommodate the need for a narrative to frame the motive.

Religious minority rebellion can thus be driven both by identity, contrary to what Nordås suggest, *and* by motive, but in neither of the cases can religion as identity be explained as a primordial identity. It is inherently a contextual construct.

5.2 Separatism and Nationalism

Separatism as found in the MAR-dataset cannot be said to equal *nationalism*. This gets strongly underlined in the Egyptian case where the Coptic (religious?) nationalism has informed peaceful responses. This contradicts Fox's use of it. Separatism is however a good indicator for whether the religious *identity* is prone to create *motives* or not.

5.3 Religious Institutions and Actors

A rather surprising finding, in *all* cases, is the fact that religious leaders are associated with peace initiatives, dialogue and inter-communal cooperation. On the other hand, lay or secular politicians are associated with heightened conflict intensity. I will not say that one of the two is better than the other, but the pattern is so clear that it cannot be ignored.

There are a number of possible reasons for this pattern. If it is representative, it is not regarding religious leaders in general. Many religious leaders engage in conflicts, but Sri Lankan Buddhist monks, the Cyprian Orthodox Church, the Serbian and the Greek Orthodox Churches are all has taken it upon themselves to embody the national chauvinism. But these are not minorities, but majority religions. If this is representative it only regards minority religions. Whether this is representative or not, and under what preconditions it occurs, becomes a question for further investigation.

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¹³ This article was under development when I was able to read it. Its contence is parallel to that of Feldtkellers (2012) but

¹⁴ This article was only available to me thrugh an online resource (<http://journals.hil.unb.ca/index.php/JCS/article/viewArticle/4310/4922>). This has no pagination, and I will therefore only refer to the entire article.

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Appendix I: Case Selection Data 1996-2000, Minorities at Risk Dataset

Two minorities, both with religious difference and no relevant level of rebellion, one with (A) and one without (B) an active separatist movement

The following data is based on material retrieved through the MARGene system, designed for feeding data with specific variables from the Minorities at Risk dataset (MAR). It is not retrieved in the same way as Fox did when he did his studies, but the general patterns should be the same. For more information see the MAR web-pages.¹⁵

The following selection of cases are sorted in a way so that all minorities have a different religion than the majority (belief=3). Further there is no registered intrastate conflict in the time period (reb=0). This analysis looks at what cases are relevant to analyze further, based on unprovoked repression being one of the strongest indicators of grievance development in minorities, thus being a strong predictor of rebellion. As the above analysis is common for two of the cases needed I also control for active separatism in the separatism index (sepx).

The scatterplots, or visual representation of each form of repression, is systematized in the following manner. From left to right you have an indicator of repression from “no repression”, “repression of politically engaged members”, and “repression of both engaged and non-engaged members”, to “repression against non-engaged group members”. From bottom to top cases are sorted in accordance to the level of separatism registered, from “no separatism”, “historical separatism”, “latent separatism” and “active separatism”.


There are a total of 23 indicators of repression in the MAR-data. This is a presentation of the 7 most significant ones based on existing coding for the selected time-frame. The selection of cases will be done on the basis of the far right indicator where repression is unprovoked, but for this presentation I choose to include the entire range of repression to secure transparency.

The following cases report no rebellion and religious difference. Cases that fit the criteria perfectly are written in **bold**. Cases that are slightly off by one of the criteria are included in *italic*. This is to secure a broader analysis where all cases and all repression are accounted for in a representing way.

¹⁵ http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/margene/mar-codebook_040903.pdf

In the end I summarize and rank each case based on number of years for each minority counted. I choose to sort the cases according to bold and italic cases because they signify relevance.


Repression 1: Many group members arrested:



Minorities Years

- A: Repr. unprovoked/Sep 3:
- 66002: Maronite Christians in Lebanon** 1
- B: Repr. unprovoked/Sep 0:
- 22006: Muslims in France** 1
- 65101: Copts in Egypt** 1
- 76001: Lhotshampas in Bhutan* 1


Repression 2: Few group members arrested:



Minorities Years

- A: Sep 3:
- 66002: Maronite Christians in Lebanon 1
 - 63003: Bahai in Iran 3
- B: Sep 0:
- 65101: Copts in Egypt 2
 - 63010: Christians in Iran 2
 - 47504: Ogani in Nigeria 1


Repression 3: Leaders arrested disappeared or detained:



Minorities Years


- A: Sep 3:
51001: Zanzibaranz in Tanzania 1
- B: Sep 0:
63010: Christians in Iran 3
53007: Amhara in Ethiopia 1

Repression 4: Show trials of members or leaders:



Minorities	Years
A: Sep 3:	
63003: Bahai in Iran	4
B: Sep 0:	
53007: Amhara in Ethiopia	1

Repression 5: Torture to intimidate or interrogate:



Minorities Years

A: Sep 3:

77502: Zomis (Chins) in Burma **2**

77501: Rohingya (Arakanese, Muslims) in Burma **1**


B: Sep 0:

65101: Copts in Egypt **1**

53007: Amhara in Ethiopia **1**

47504: Ogani in Nigeria **4**


Repression 6: Members executed by authorities:



Minorities Years

- A: Sep 3:
63003: *Bahai in Iran* 1
77501: *Rohingya (Arakanese, Muslims) in Burma* 2
- B: Sep 0:

Repression 7: Leaders executed by authorities:



Minorities	Years
A: Sep 3:	
63003: Bahai in Iran	1
B: Sep 0:	
63010: Christians in Iran	2

Summary of repression/years and rel.dif. for each minority:

A: Active Separatism:	Years:	Rel.dif.:
66002: Maronite Christians in Lebanon	2	Chr/Musl
77502: Zomis (Chins) in Burma	2	Chr/Budh
77501: Rohingya (Arakanese, Muslims) in Burma	1	Musl/Budh
<i>63003: Bahai in Iran</i>	<i>9</i>	<i>Oth/Musl</i>
<i>51001: Zanzibaranz in Tanzania</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>Musl/Chr</i>
<i>77501: Rohingya (Arakanese, musl) in Burma</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>Musl/Budh</i>
B: No Separatism:		
65101: Copts in Egypt	4	Chr/Musl
53007: Amhara in Ethiopia	2	Chr/Musl
22006: Muslims in France	1	Musl/Chr
<i>63010: Christians in Iran</i>	<i>7</i>	Chr/Musl
<i>47504: Ogani in Nigeria</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>Indig./Chr</i>
<i>53007: Amhara in Ethiopia</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>Chri/Musl</i>
<i>76001: Lhotshampas in Bhutan</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>Ind.Ch/Budh</i>

Appendix II: Case Selection Data 1996-2000, Minorities at Risk Dataset

Minority with religious difference, active separatism and high conflict intensity

The following data is based on material retrieved through the MARGene system, designed for feeding data with specific variables from the Minorities at Risk dataset (MAR). It is not retrieved in the same way as Fox did when he did his studies, but the general patterns should be the same. For more information see the MAR web-pages.¹⁶

The following selection of cases is sorted in such a way that only cases with a level of rebellion coded to between 5 and 7 are included. The scale starts at 0 and ends at 7 being the highest level of rebellion. In other words, only intrastate conflicts where the minority has rebellious movements considered being more than small-scale insurgency, in accordance to the list REB copied from the coding manual at the end of the document. The additional list REBEL is added later, is not used by Fox, but describes the categories in more depth. Further, only minorities with a religion different from the majority are included.

The separatism-index *sepx* is not used to sort the data, but the pattern visible is an echo of the pattern I intend to investigate in this thesis. The only cases with a different output are 75009, which is insignificant as there is latent separatism in the minority, and 36504, which seems to be a miscoding of the data as the Chechen conflict with Russia is considered to be a separatist conflict in the predominant part of the literature on the issue.

The variable *relnat* does not exist in the original data, but is a result of a combination of the values in the variable *belief* and *sepx* ($\text{belief} + 1 * \text{sepx}$) applied by Jonathan Fox¹⁷ to calculate religious nationalism. It has no significant role in this summary, except as an indicator of the sum of active separatism and religious difference, and that this should follow the pattern and level of intrastate conflict in the way it does here.

As a result this list profiles the most important intrastate conflicts between 1996 and 2000 where religious difference can play a central role. The variable *religs1* indicates the religion

¹⁶ http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/margene/mar-codebook_040903.pdf

¹⁷ Fox, J. (2004) "The Rise of Religious Nationalism and Conflict: Ethnic Conflict and Revolutionary Wars, 1945-2001" in *Journal of Peace Research* (41:715)

and denomination of the minority in accordance to the list copied from the coding manual at the end of the document. Additionally I have chosen to color code all cases according to religion (Christian /blue, Muslims/green, animists/purple, other/yellow).

country	Group	numcode	region	year	belief	religs1	sepx	reb	relnat
INDIA	NAGAS	75009	3.0	1999	3	2.0	2	5	8
AZERBAIJAN	ARMENIANS	37301	2.0	1997	3	3.0	3	7	12
INDONESIA	PAPUANS	85005	3.0	1996	3	3.0	3	5	12
RUSSIA	CHECHENS	36504	2.0	1996	3	4.0	0	6	0
RUSSIA	CHECHENS	36504	2.0	1999	3	4.0	0	7	0
RUSSIA	CHECHENS	36504	2.0	2000	3	4.0	0	7	0
INDIA	KASHMIRIS	75007	3.0	1996	3	4.0	3	6	12
INDIA	KASHMIRIS	75007	3.0	1997	3	4.0	3	6	12
INDIA	KASHMIRIS	75007	3.0	1998	3	4.0	3	6	12
INDIA	KASHMIRIS	75007	3.0	1999	3	4.0	3	6	12
INDIA	KASHMIRIS	75007	3.0	2000	3	4.0	3	6	12
THAILAND	MALAY-MUSLIMS	80002	3.0	1997	3	4.0	3	5	12
PHILIPPINES	MOROS	84003	3.0	1997	3	4.0	3	6	12
PHILIPPINES	MOROS	84003	3.0	1998	3	4.0	3	6	12
PHILIPPINES	MOROS	84003	3.0	1999	3	4.0	3	6	12
PHILIPPINES	MOROS	84003	3.0	2000	3	4.0	3	6	12
SUDAN	SOUTHERNERS	62501	6.0	1996	3	8.0	3	7	12
SUDAN	SOUTHERNERS	62501	6.0	1997	3	8.0	3	7	12
SUDAN	SOUTHERNERS	62501	6.0	1998	3	8.0	3	7	12
SUDAN	SOUTHERNERS	62501	6.0	1999	3	8.0	3	7	12
SUDAN	SOUTHERNERS	62501	6.0	2000	3	8.0	3	7	12
SRI LANKA	SRI LANKAN TAMILS	78002	3.0	1996	3	9.0	3	7	12
SRI LANKA	SRI LANKAN TAMILS	78002	3.0	1997	3	9.0	3	7	12
SRI LANKA	SRI LANKAN TAMILS	78002	3.0	1998	3	9.0	3	7	12
SRI LANKA	SRI LANKAN TAMILS	78002	3.0	1999	3	9.0	3	7	12
SRI LANKA	SRI LANKAN TAMILS	78002	3.0	2000	3	9.0	3	7	12

RELIGS1 Specific Religion(s): Most Numerous **36**

Missing Values: -99

Value Label

- 1 Roman Catholic
 - 2 Protestant
 - 3 Other Christian Sect
 - 4 Sunni
 - 5 Shi'ite
 - 6 Other Islamic Sect
 - 7 Buddhist
 - 8 Animist
 - 9 Other
-

REB Annual Rebellion Index, 1985-2000 **425**

Missing Values: -99

Value Label

- 0 None reported
 - 1 Political banditry
 - 2 Campaigns of terrorism
 - 3 Local rebellion
 - 4 Small-scale guerrilla activity
 - 5 Intermediate guerrilla activity
 - 6 Large-scale guerrilla activity
 - 7 Protracted civil war
 - 99 No basis for judgment
-

REBEL Rebellion Index: 1945-99 **424**

Missing Values: -99

Value Label

0 None reported

1 Political banditry, sporadic terrorism

2 Campaigns of terrorism

3 Local rebellions

Armed attempts to seize power in a locale. If they prove to be the opening round in what becomes a protracted guerrilla or civil war during the year being coded, code the latter rather than local rebellion. Code declarations of independence by a minority-controlled government here.

4 Small-scale guerrilla activity

All of the following must exist:

- 1) fewer than 1000 armed fighters;
- 2) sporadic armed attacks (less than six reported per year); and
- 3) attacks in a small part of the area occupied by the group, or in one or two other locales.

5 Intermediate guerrilla activity

Has one or two of the defining traits of large-scale activity and one or two of the defining traits of small-scale activity.

6 Large-scale guerrilla activity

All of the following must exist:

1) more than 1000 armed fighters;
2) frequent armed attacks (more than 6
per year); and 3) attacks affecting a
large part of the area occupied by
the group.

7 Protracted civil war

Fought by rebel military units with
base areas.

99 No basis for judgment

Appendix III: Number of Religious Intrastate Armed Conflicts with Separatism and Different Religion or Denomination

Based on Nordås' Table A4-2. "Countries with Religious Intrastate Armed Conflicts (Issues Perspective) and Conflict Severity in Battle Deaths" augmented with data on religious difference and separatism. (Nordås 2010:235)

Analysis of the numbers shows that of all religious intrastate armed conflicts 61,9% of the rebel groups have a separatist or secessionist agenda. Agendas that include nationalistic claims to power within the country is not included.

Of the conflicts where minority and majority follow different religions or denominations the percentage of separatist agendas are 73,3%.

Among the conflicts where the groups adhere to the same religion 21,4% have separatist agendas.

Of all religious intrastate armed conflicts with separatist agendas, 88% were between groups with religious or denominational difference whereas 69% of the total selection.

State	Conflict	Religion issue	Battle deaths	Sep.	Rel.dif.
Afghanistan	Various Islamists	Major	558 200	0	0
Algeria	Various Islamists	Major	92 017	0	0
Bangladesh	Chittagong Hill Tracts	Minor	3 500	1	1
Bosnia- Herzegovina	Croatian irregulars	Minor	13 687	1	1
Bosnia- Herzegovina	Serb	Minor	40 413	1	1
Chad	Various insurgent groups	Minor	39 961	0	1
Côte d'Ivoire	Forces Nouvelles	Minor	1 200	0	1
Egypt	Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya	Major	1 179	0	0
Eritrea	Eretrean Islamic Jihad	Major	391	0	1
Ethiopia	Ogaden	Major	42 091	1	1
Ethiopia	al-Itahad al-Islami	Minor	562	1	1
India	Sikh insurgents	Minor	18 875	1	1
India	Kashmir insurgents	Minor	26 501	1	1
India	Bodoland	Minor	743	1	0
India	Tripura	Minor	1 936	1	0
India	Nagaland	Minor	2 609	1	1
Indonesia	East Timor	Minor	3 352	1	1
Indonesia	Aceh	Minor	5 197	1	0
Iran	Kurdistan	Minor	11 399	1	1
Iraq	Mujahideen e Khalq/PJAK	Minor	10 082	0	0
Iraq	Various Islamists	Major	32 404	0	0
Israel	Palestine	Minor	16 959	1	1
Laos	LRM (Hmong)	Minor	23 555	1	1
	Islamic Arab Front of				
Mali	Azward	Minor	300	0	0
Myanmar	Araken	Minor	1 125	1	1
Myanmar	Karen	Minor	14 927	1	1
Myanmar	Kachin	Minor	19 032	1	1
Nigeria	Northern Nigeria	Major	52	0	1
Philippines	Mindanao	Major	42 295	1	1
Russia	(Wahhabi)	Major	350	1	1
Russia	Chachnya	Minor	97 400	1	1
Sri Lanka	Tamil Tigers LTTE	Minor	55 389	1	1
Sudan	SLA/JEM	Minor	6 013	0	0
Sudan	Southern Sudan	Major	75 853	1	1
Tajikistan	United Tajik Opposition	Minor	41 300	0	0
Thailand	Patani	Major	1 205	1	1
Trinidad/Tobago	Jama'at al-Muslimeen	Minor	30	0	1
Uganda	Lord's Resistance Army	Minor	122 894	0	0
UK	IRA	Minor	3 149	1	1
USA	al-Qaida	Major	7 415	0	1
Uzbekistan	Jihad Islamic Group	Major	107	0	0
Yugoslavia (Serbia)	Kosovo	Minor	4 500	1	1

